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4Preface
Assessing a nascent market—or one that isn’t clearly defined—is a tricky undertaking.This is  
precisely the challenge we confronted when we sought to scan the market for social impact 
bonds (SIBs) in the United States. 
Simply stated, a SIB is a new approach for expanding social programs. It is a partnership in 
which philanthropic funders and impact investors—not governments—take on the financial risk 
of scaling up. Nonprofits deliver the program; the government pays only if the program succeeds. 
Because the concept of SIBs is so new (the first and only SIB is being piloted in the United  
Kingdom), information about how—and how well—they could work is currently very limited.
This report represents our initial contribution to the discussion. We conducted a rigorous,  
data-driven analysis of the potential and capacity for SIBs in the United States. We disaggregated 
the SIB ecosystem into stakeholder groups (constituents, government, nonprofit service provid-
ers, investors, intermediaries, evaluation advisers, and independent assessors), identified the 
obstacles each group might face, and thought through how those obstacles would affect the  
ecosystem as a whole. We studied how SIBs might be applied in two program areas (homeless-
ness and criminal justice), and did a pro forma analysis of a SIB in the juvenile justice arena to 
show how the economics of a SIB could play out. Throughout our research, we avoided the 
temptation to gaze into our crystal ball: for example, rather than project how current trends (such 
as changing demographics) might affect the longer-term potential of SIBs, we stuck to the facts—
basing all our analysis on the most recently available data from government agencies, nonpartisan 
research institutions, foundations, and academia. 
Although our findings will be of interest to a diverse audience, including think tanks, financial 
advisers, academics, and the media, our work is primarily geared toward three particular groups: 
policy makers and government administrators looking to create cross-sector partnerships to scale 
evidence-based social solutions, investors able to prioritize social impact over financial returns, 
and nonprofit service providers seeking multiyear growth capital to expand preventive social 
programs.
 
MOVING SOCIAL INNOVATION FORWARD
Through our Social Sector office, McKinsey is committed to fostering social innovation. We find 
SIBs an interesting concept because we believe social innovation happens at the intersection of 
the public, private, and social sectors. Indeed, SIBs bring these three sectors together: under a 
SIB contract, government works with private investors and nonprofit service providers to scale 
up high-impact programs that help people in need. Our research on SIBs represents a natural 
progression of our work on social innovation. In our view, two of the most important elements of 
social innovation are social finance and social impact assessment—and SIBs are strongly rooted 
in both.  
Social finance mobilizes additional capital—or increases the effectiveness of current funding—to 
maximize impact. It unlocks value in the social sector by overcoming barriers that hinder the 
growth of social initiatives—barriers such as poor cash-flow management, fragmented demand, 
and demand uncertainty. Our work in the field of social finance encompasses the areas of global 
public health (for example, advanced market commitments) and financial inclusion. SIBs are an-
other example of how incentives and investment can be recalibrated to stimulate social change.
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Social impact assessment is a complex topic. In April 2010, we launched our “Learning for Social 
Impact” initiative (lsi.mckinsey.com), which provides a database of 150 tools and assessment 
methods, a collection of best practices, a workbook, and other practical resources to encourage 
an attitude of learning consistent with the development and scaling of evidence-based programs. 
Exploring SIBs, which include assessment as a key structural component, is a logical next phase 
of this work. 
 
In addition to this report on SIBs, we are developing two sets of tools that can be used by stake-
holders who choose to pursue SIBs. A number of partners are contributing to the design and test-
ing of these tools including the Nonprofit Finance Fund (NFF); we will make these tools available 
to stakeholders through NFF’s Pay for Success Learning Hub (payforsuccess.org).
Rapid suitability assessment. Many stakeholders have expressed a need for a way to ascertain 
whether their organizations—as well as potential partner organizations—are well suited to SIBs.  
We are designing a set of easy-to-use Web-based questionnaires, each of which takes only 10 
minutes to complete, to help stakeholders identify their (or their potential partners’) strengths and 
areas for development relevant to SIBs. 
 
Capabilities due diligence. Each SIB stakeholder brings to the table different skills and abilities. 
A thorough capabilities due diligence will give investors and other stakeholders an understanding 
of their partners’ ability to fulfill their roles. We will provide a capabilities checklist tailored to each 
stakeholder, along with an interview guide, a document request list, data-gathering templates, a  
scoring rubric, and a how-to guide for conducting a streamlined due-diligence process. 
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We are committed to making this US market scan a living resource. As such, we structured our 
analysis in a way that can be expanded to keep pace with SIB market growth. We have shared 
our methodology with Social Finance US, an organization that has provided extensive support in 
the preparation of this project. Social Finance US will periodically update the analysis and make 
the results available to all interested parties.
Our research and expert interviews have led us to the conclusion that SIBs have potential as a 
tool to help solve America’s societal problems at scale. We see this report as just a beginning—a 
starting point to capture the current state of affairs and inform stakeholders who choose to take 
action on SIBs.  
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Executive summary
A social impact bond (SIB) is a new approach for scaling social programs. Currently being piloted 
in the United Kingdom and generating interest globally, a SIB is a multistakeholder partnership in 
which philanthropic funders and impact investors—not governments—take on the financial risk 
of expanding preventive programs that help poor and vulnerable people. Nonprofits deliver the 
program to more people who need it; the government pays only if the program succeeds. 
Because the concept of a SIB is so new (the first and only SIB is the UK pilot mentioned above), 
information about how—and how well—this approach could work is very limited. In this report, the 
most thoroughly researched study of SIBs to date, we explain how SIBs are structured, assess 
their potential in two specific program areas (homelessness and criminal justice), describe the 




A SIB structures a government contract for social services as a type of pay-for-performance 
contract. There are seven stakeholder groups involved in a SIB: constituents (the direct benefi-
ciaries of the social services), government, nonprofit service providers, investors, intermediaries 
(responsible for overall SIB project management), evaluation advisers (to help monitor and refine 
the program), and independent assessors (to determine if SIB targets are met). 
SIB investors provide capital that fulfills two purposes: up front, it pays for the services of the 
nonprofit service provider and, over the lifetime of the SIB, for the intermediary, the evaluation 
adviser, and the independent assessor. The intermediary raises capital from investors, selects the 
service providers, contracts with government, works with the evaluation adviser and the indepen-
dent assessor to set and measure performance targets, and partners with the evaluation adviser 
to monitor and analyze interim results and suggest midcourse corrections. If the program meets 
performance targets, the government pays the intermediary an agreed amount. The intermediary 
is responsible for repaying the investors their capital plus a return on investment.  
The primary benefits of SIBs 
The participation of the intermediary, the evaluation adviser, and the independent assessor adds 
cost when compared with a scenario in which the government pays a service provider directly. So 
are SIBs worth the trouble? Our research suggests they are, under the right conditions. SIBs offer 
three major benefits:
 
SIBs are a tool to scale proven social interventions. SIBs could fill a critical void: other than 
market-based approaches, a structured and replicable model for scaling proven solutions has not 
existed previously. SIBs can give structure to the critical handoff between philanthropy (the risk 
capital of social innovation) and government (the scale-up capital of social innovation) to bring 
evidence-based interventions to more people. SIBs can do this by aligning incentives among a 
broad set of stakeholders and shifting financial risk away from government. 
 SIBs support government’s goal of performance transformation. SIBs can help government 
move toward paying for results rather than paying for activities. The oversight and support pro-
vided to a SIB-funded program are intended to boost quality and performance, making successful 
implementation more likely. SIBs can also facilitate another critical shift, moving resources from 
remediation to prevention: they focus on forward-thinking programs that anticipate and ameliorate 
8problems before they arise rather than after they’ve materialized and negatively affected individu-
als and communities. If SIBs work as intended, they could enhance alignment and collaboration 
across government agencies. They could also reinforce and accelerate government’s adoption of 
robust, coordinated data systems, which are key to understanding whether new programs have 
made a difference. 
SIBs reward the social sector’s investment in what works. To date, some nonprofit service 
providers have faced a frustrating situation: they’ve taken the time to collect data and discover 
what works for vulnerable people, only to find that there is no way to get these alternative pro-
grams to scale. SIBs can help break this pattern, rewarding service providers who have created 
effective programs.
 
SIBS IN HOMELESSNESS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
To develop a more precise understanding of SIBs’ potential in the United States, we conducted 
in-depth analyses of two social issues—homelessness and criminal justice—that experts repeat-
edly told us could benefit tremendously from SIBs. We structured our analyses around four key 
questions: 
• Are the current remedial costs on a scale that makes the potential savings meaningful?  
• Are there proven preventive interventions to help the target population?  
• Are there service providers with the capacity to scale these interventions?  
• Is there a meaningful number of constituents who could be served?
Our findings indicate that homelessness—with as much as $6 billion to $7 billion in government 
spending on remedial programs, at least one proven preventive intervention (Permanent Support-
ive Housing) that benefits chronically homeless people, a large number of qualified service provid-
ers, and approximately 110,000 chronically homeless constituents—would be a natural focus area 
for SIBs. Another potential program area is juvenile and adult criminal justice. Government spend-
ing on national corrections is significant—$74 billion in 2007—although SIBs can address only a 
fraction of current spending since not all prisoners will be eligible for preventive programs.  
We identified four proven interventions for youth and two for adults, and although there aren’t 
enough providers focused exclusively on correctional alternatives, there are many at-scale  
providers of preventive programs in areas like youth services, substance abuse treatment, and 
mental health treatment. As for the constituent population, a subset of the more than 50,000  
incarcerated youth who are nonviolent offenders and the 1.6 million incarcerated adults with  
mental health or substance abuse disorders could receive treatment in community-based  
programs. Even in just the two areas we studied, there’s a vast difference in the availability of data 
and, consequently, in the nature of the conclusions we can draw. These differences underscore 
the importance of undertaking a detailed analysis for SIBs in each new program area. 
 
THE SIB ECOSYSTEM
Each stakeholder group involved in a SIB must have certain characteristics and capabilities, and 
will face different challenges: 
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Service providers. SIBs offer a way for nonprofit service providers to scale proven interventions. 
To be ready to scale through a SIB, service providers need a strong operating model, a thorough 
understanding of what it will take to adapt and expand the target intervention, familiarity with  
social impact assessment, and experience working with partners. Local community knowledge 
and relationships will also be important. Service providers that have already qualified for  
government contracts may be likely candidates for early SIBs.
Government. SIBs are already generating interest from federal, state, and city governments.  
Local governments that decide to pursue SIBs may consider specific actions including  
spearheading pilots, coordinating among programs and agencies on SIB terms and structure, and 
ensuring that their data systems are capable of tracking cost and service utilization at the client 
level. If the federal government chooses to continue the support it has already shown pay-for-
success approaches, it could play a critical role in incentivizing cross-agency collaboration and 
providing supplemental financial support for program assessment. 
Investors. First-wave SIBs will most likely attract philanthropic funders and “Impact First” impact 
investors willing to accept below-market financial returns. “Finance First” impact investors may be 
interested in future SIBs, especially if their returns can be enhanced. Investors will understandably 
be hesitant to fund an untested model. Intermediaries structuring SIBs could raise investors’ com-
fort level by standardizing SIBs through consistent structures and common templates, promoting 
SIBs that scale proven (rather than promising) interventions, and constructing SIBs in such a way 
that repayment is tied to the achievement of social outcomes as opposed to government savings. 
Intermediaries. Because they manage a SIB throughout its entire life cycle, intermediaries must 
possess expertise in the relevant social issue, financing skills, and project management capabili-
ties. Two kinds of organizations appear to have the capabilities to play the SIB intermediary role: 
established organizations with broad skills and mandates and newly formed organizations like 
Social Finance US, which is specifically focused on SIBs. A robust cadre of SIB intermediaries will 
be needed for SIBs to reach critical mass; we believe community development financial institu-
tions, community development venture capital funds, and community foundations will ultimately 
fill this role. 
Evaluators. Every SIB requires two evaluators, each fulfilling a distinct role: one is an ongoing 
adviser to the intermediary and the service provider, while the other is an arm’s-length auditor that 
assesses whether the SIB met its performance targets. We have coined the terms “evaluation ad-
viser” and “independent assessor” to describe these roles. Qualified organizations will likely have 
similar skill sets: program area expertise, extensive evaluation experience, and a collaborative 
attitude. We found eight evaluation firms interested in and capable of playing either role.
Our research and expert interviews indicate that within the SIB ecosystem are competent players 
who could launch the first wave of SIBs. We therefore do not expect stakeholder capacity to be a 
constraint.
 
A PRO FORMA ANALYSIS OF A  JUVENILE JUSTICE SIB
To help stakeholders understand how a SIB might be structured, we constructed an analysis of 
a hypothetical SIB. We sought answers to questions such as: what’s the potential for taxpayer 
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benefits? How long will it take to pay back investors? Our analysis is not representative of SIB 
economics in general, but our analytical approach, the assumptions we made, and how we  
applied intervention data can inform the field’s understanding of how SIBs can be structured.
We chose Functional Family Therapy (FFT) as the preventive intervention for our pro forma 
analysis, relying heavily on data from the Washington State Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP). 
We imagined a SIB that delivered FFT to a total of 4,500 youths over 3 years (one cohort of 1,500 
15-year-old youths per year). Factoring in the additional costs inherent in a SIB, the SIB needs 
12 years to generate a reasonable level of taxpayer benefits, government savings, and investor 
returns. In contrast, FFT breaks even in only 8 years if the government simply went directly to FFT 
service providers and paid them to expand the program to more constituents.
This highlights a crucial point: SIBs are an expensive way to finance the scaling up of preventive 
programs. A SIB’s “premium” is justified if conventional options aren’t working, or if the SIB helps 
government, philanthropy, and other social sector actors align their priorities and play their roles 
more effectively and efficiently. 
 
THE  WAY FORWARD
If stakeholders choose to pursue SIBs, three actions can help ensure success: developing a 
robust education and communications plan, embracing SIBs primarily for their social (rather than 
financial) benefits, and paying careful attention to design and implementation for early SIBs,  
which will be much-studied role models for future SIBs. To justify broad scale-up, SIBs must  
demonstrate a number of proof points: for instance, they must prove successful in multiple  
jurisdictions and program areas, and show clear evidence of social outcomes.
As we look to a future in which SIBs are but one part of a broader conversation about  
public-private collaboration and innovation to serve people and communities better, we  
reiterate two important points:
SIB scaling will require standardization. While they will always be relatively bespoke, SIBs will 
benefit from standardization as soon as—and wherever—possible. Stakeholders can advance SIBs 
by sharing best practice methods for cost benefit analysis and for scoping new program areas and 
geographies; by making diagnostic tools, term sheets, and report formats publicly available; and by 
communicating lessons learned about what it takes to make a SIB partnership successful.
Much remains to be seen. A number of issues are beyond the scope of our research, and  
a number of questions on the future of SIBs remain open. For example, will SIBs become a  
permanent part of the government financing landscape? Based on experience demonstrated 
through a SIB, will government choose to fund additional preventive programs by contracting 
directly with service providers? Will government begin to issue traditional municipal bonds to 
provide financing?
We see SIBs as part of a broader effort to transform the social sector to better serve the needs 
of people and their communities. Whether or not SIBs become a popular approach to scaling 
interventions, they have already generated excitement and enthusiasm for finding new ways to 
address persistent social problems. If SIBs galvanize a new wave of innovation and pave the way 
for other alternative models, their impact will be truly significant.
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1. Introduction
You are the CEO of a nonprofit organization focused on a critical social issue—say, homelessness. 
Your organization has developed a program that has helped 100 people in your city move into sta-
ble living situations and get their lives back on track. Over time, you have tested and refined your 
approach and assessed the results. You can demonstrate that your program prevents chronic 
homelessness, and you’d like to expand it to help more people in your state—but you don’t have 
the funding to do so. The foundations that have supported the development and testing of your 
program don’t have sufficient resources to help you take it to scale.
Or perhaps you are a government administrator. You are frustrated at the lack of progress the  
government has made in eradicating homelessness. You realize that some government programs 
are tackling the problem too late—they are mostly remedial in nature and aren’t making a  
sustainable impact; the statistics refuse to budge. You think it’s time to try new programs,  
especially preventive solutions, and you have both the reach and the resources to make a  
meaningful difference. Current ways of working make it difficult to replace existing programs  
with alternatives—but, given the opportunity, that’s just what you’d like to do.
These scenarios are playing out every day, on almost every social issue. Nonprofits with success-
ful preventive programs struggle to scale them; government continues to spend money on some 
ineffective remedial programs; society loses out. What’s to be done?
Enter the social impact bond (SIB)—a new tool for scaling programs that help poor and vulnerable 
people. Currently being piloted in the United Kingdom but generating interest globally, a SIB is a 
multistakeholder partnership in which philanthropic funders and impact investors—not govern-
ments—take on the financial risk of expanding proven social programs. Nonprofits deliver the 
social program to more people who need it; the government pays only if the program succeeds. 
Because SIBs are so new—the UK pilot is currently the world’s one and only SIB—much of what’s 
been written about them has been based on theory rather than data. In this report, the most 
thoroughly researched study of SIBs to date, we discuss the benefits and limitations of SIBs and 
explore their potential in the United States. In addition to reviewing the relevant literature, we 
conducted more than 125 interviews with subject-matter experts and created a quantitative model 
showing how a SIB might work. Our objectives were to evaluate SIBs’ benefits and costs, identify 
the constraints to SIBs in the United States, identify options to overcome these constraints, help 
stakeholders assess whether SIBs are right for them, and provide the information they would need 
to begin planning for a SIB.
In this first chapter, we explain what a SIB is, describe how it works and who it benefits, and  
discuss the current state of play in the United States and elsewhere.
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Despite its name, a SIB is not a bond at all (see box, “Mind the misnomer: A social impact bond 
is not a bond”). Rather, it is an innovative form of cross-sector collaboration that can help gov-
ernment transition from funding remedial efforts to addressing social problems through higher-
impact, less costly preventive solutions. 
Philanthropic donors fund pilots that demonstrate the efficacy of preventive programs, but that’s 
as far as it goes. Programs that work aren’t always expanded to the entire population that needs 
them because only government has the reach and the resources to provide the multiyear funding 
required for scale-up. But government’s existing legacy systems tend to focus on remediation, 
and fiscal constraints can make it tough to introduce alternative approaches. 
SIBs offer a new option for expanding proven preventive programs. They can facilitate the  
critical handoff from philanthropy—which provides the “risk capital” of social innovation by  
funding and testing new programs—to government, which has both the capital and policy  
influence to take programs to scale. While all the potential applications have not been fully  
explored, SIBs seem especially well suited to scale interventions focused on behavior change.1 
Their initial focus on programs requiring intense case management, and the integrated role of  
assessment to ensure quality replication, suggest SIBs are highly applicable to multifaceted  
behavior change interventions. Other methods for scaling, which tend to be more market oriented, 
lend themselves best to expanding access to products (bed nets, for instance) and services  
(such as access to clean water). 
1 Behavior change programs share information and provide motivation to assist individuals in changing their behavior for positive 
social benefits. Examples range from drunk driving campaigns to sobriety programs to programs for low-income first-time mothers 
(such as the Nurse-Family Partnership).
A SIB is a new approach for expanding 
successful social programs. It is a partnership 
in which private investors —not governments—provide 
capital for nonprofits to scale up. The government pays 
only if the program succeeds.
13
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A bond is a debt investment in which an investor loans money to a bond issuer for a defined time 
period at an agreed interest rate. Cities and states typically issue municipal bonds and similar debt 
instruments to fund capital projects and manage ongoing financing needs. These municipal bonds 
are backed either by specific revenue streams (bonds issued to build a toll road, for example, are 
repaid with toll revenue) or by the issuing government’s general obligation and full taxing authority. 
SIBs are not bonds or debt instruments but rather multistakeholder partnerships managed through 
a series of contracts. (In fact, the original notion was to call them “social impact partnerships,” not 
bonds.) SIBs bear some resemblance to the multiyear contracts governments already enter into, 
which are subject to annual budget appropriations. Without special legislative authority, the govern-
ment’s obligation to pay SIB investors will not be commensurate with its obligation to pay traditional 
municipal bondholders. 
The state of Minnesota recently introduced Human Capital Performance Bonds—now commonly 
referred to as “Minnesota Bonds” or “HUCAPs”—that in some ways resemble traditional municipal 
bonds and in other ways resemble SIBs. Minnesota Bonds are sold to private investors and backed 
by annual appropriations from the state budget. Their proceeds are used to pay direct service  
providers once these providers hit predefined performance targets.
Mind the misnomer: A social impact bond is not a bond
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HOW DOES A SOCIAL 
IMPACT BOND WORK?
Glossary of terms
Remedial services: Government programs that address negative social outcomes after they’ve  
occurred (e.g., incarceration for criminals, emergency room access for the chronically homeless).  
Preventive interventions: Social service programs that focus on avoiding negative social outcomes  
(e.g., alternatives to incarceration, permanent supportive housing for the chronically homeless).  
Constituent treatment group: Those individuals who benefit from the preventive intervention and  
whose results are compared to others who did not receive similar services.
Evaluation adviser monitors 
ongoing progress of the 
preventive program, working 
with the intermediary and service 
providers to refine program 
based on interim results
Intermediary raises capital from 
investors; selects and manages 
nonprofit direct service providers, 
retains evaluation adviser and selects 
independent assessor; and provides 
overall SIB project management
Service providers receive 
multiyear funding from 
intermediary to deliver 
evidence-based preventive 
programs to constituent 
treatment group
Government currently 
provides costly remedial 
programs for constituents
Government contracts with intermediary 
for delivery of preventive programs to 
improve constituents’ lives, reducing 
their demand for remedial programs
Investors provide up-front 
capital to intermediary to 
pay for preventive programs; 
investors are repaid their 
capital plus a return only if 




determines if predetermined 
performance targets are met; if 
targets are achieved, government 
repays investors with a return 
and pays a success bonus to 
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1  Constituents are the heart of a SIB’s work. They 
are the people who will directly benefit from the 
social interventions funded and scaled through a 
SIB. They might include chronically homeless or 
incarcerated individuals.  
 
State and local governments already provide  
(or contract with nonprofit service providers that 
provide) remedial services to these constituents,  
paid for out of taxpayer funds.  
2  Knowing that there are preventive solutions that 
have been proven to improve constituents’ lives 
and reduce the need for remedial services, the 
state or local government enters a contract with an 
intermediary to develop a SIB. (Note that without 
government support, SIBs will not happen.)  
Under the contract, the intermediary takes  
responsibility for identifying qualified nonprofit 
service providers and evidence-based preventive 
solutions, raising capital from investors to bring 
the solutions to scale, conducting ongoing  
project management, and working with the  
nonprofit service providers to ensure effective 
implementation. The government agrees to repay  
investors—via the intermediary—capital plus a  
return on investment if the program meets  
predetermined performance targets (for example,  
a percent reduction in recidivism). If the  
performance targets are met, the intermediary  
and the service provider will also receive a  
success fee. The intermediary links all the other 
stakeholders together in the service of the  
constituents. 
3  In the near term, due to the high level of risk, SIB 
investors likely will be private foundations or  
others who prioritize benefits to society over  
financial rewards for themselves. (We expect that, 
over time, impact investors will become more 
interested in SIBs.) The SIB investors transfer funds 
through the intermediary to pay the nonprofit  
service provider to deliver services, cover a 
management fee for the intermediary, and pay the 
costs of evaluation. SIB investors understand that 
they will be repaid only if the preventive program 
achieves preset performance targets.
4  The intermediary provides multiyear funding to one 
or more nonprofit service providers to scale up 
preventive solutions. As noted above, these service 
providers stand to receive a bonus if they deliver 
the promised outcomes.
5  The nonprofit service providers scale up their op-
erations and deliver preventive interventions  
to an expanded group of constituents.
6  As the nonprofit service providers deliver the pro-
gram under the multiyear SIB contract, the inter-
mediary monitors performance and ensures that 
the program continues to deliver as expected as it 
reaches scale. To do this, the intermediary hires an 
evaluation adviser. The evaluation adviser is in-
volved in a number of activities, including determin-
ing the evaluation approach, defining performance 
outcomes, monitoring progress, and suggesting 
course corrections if needed. 
7  An independent assessor is also involved in set-
ting the evaluation approach and defining perfor-
mance outcomes. When it comes time to deter-
mine whether the performance targets in the SIB 
contract have been met, the independent assessor 
reviews the constituent treatment group relative 
to a counterfactual, and reports on whether the 
target outcomes have been achieved. Based on the 
assessor’s report, the government knows whether, 
and how much, to repay investors according to the 
terms of the SIB.
16
Government provides services for individuals and communities in areas such as shelter, health 
care, and foster care. It sometimes delivers these services directly, but more often, it contracts 
with nonprofit organizations to operate homeless shelters, community health clinics, and foster 
homes. A SIB structures a government contract for social services as a type of pay-for-perfor-
mance contract, with the financial risk shifted to investors.
SIB investors provide capital that fulfills two purposes: up front, it pays for the services of the  
nonprofit service provider and, over the lifetime of the SIB, for the intermediary, the evaluation 
adviser, and the independent assessor. 
The SIB intermediary coordinates this multifaceted partnership. The intermediary raises capital 
from investors, selects the service providers, contracts with government, works with the indepen-
dent assessor and the evaluation adviser to set and measure performance targets, and partners 
with the evaluation adviser to monitor and analyze interim results and suggest midcourse correc-
tions.
If specific social outcomes are achieved (see box, “Measuring success: The ins and outs of  
inputs, activities, outputs, and outcomes”), the intervention is deemed successful and the  
government pays the intermediary an agreed amount. The intermediary is responsible for repaying 
the investors their capital plus a return on investment. The intermediary and the service provider 
also receive a performance payment if the intervention succeeds.
Although the participation of the intermediary, the evaluation adviser, and the independent  
assessor adds cost when compared with a scenario in which the government pays a service 
provider directly, the SIB structure is designed to add value as well. The oversight and support 
provided to a SIB-funded program is intended to boost quality and performance, making  
successful implementation more likely and helping programs to scale to new communities or  
geographies. SIB-funded programs are more expensive, suggesting SIBs should be used only  
if there are no suitable alternatives—but if SIBs deliver a more effective program, they will offer 
better value for money in the long run.
 
SIBs facilitate the critical  
handoff from from philanthropy  
to government.
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Measuring success: The ins and outs of inputs, activities, outputs, and outcomes 
When service providers plan an intervention—teach-
ing prisoners a vocational skill such as barbering, for 
example—they aim to achieve a specific goal or set  
of goals. Perhaps they want to increase inmates’ future 
employability, make them more confident, and keep 
them occupied so they avoid violent behavior while  
in jail. These changes that result from an intervention 
are the outcomes. 
Achieving an outcome requires inputs. In the  
barbering example, inputs would include trainers  
who know the barbering craft, equipment (razors,  
scissors, combs, and so on), and heads on which  
to practice. After a set of activities—such as hair-
cutting lessons and technique demonstrations—it 
becomes possible to measure the output of the  
activities. In this case, one output is the number of 
inmates who acquire barbering skills. 
Today many social programs are judged based on 
inputs, activities, or outputs. These types of metrics, 
however, are not the optimal way to assess whether 
the program is achieving its goals. A barbering 
certificate, after all, may not automatically result in 
postincarceration employment. Take the case of Marc 
La Cloche, a former New York State inmate who was 
denied the license required to practice the craft he 
spent hours honing  
in prison.* 
Because things don’t always go as planned, the  
emphasis should be on measuring outcomes: were  
the inmates able to secure and retain barbering jobs 
when they were released from prison? Outcomes are 
the most accurate measures of whether a social  
program is on the right track or whether it needs  
redirection.
Measuring social impact is not a straightforward 
science. For more on our recommended approach, 
please see lsi.mckinsey.com.
What makes SIBs appealing to stakeholders 
SIBs are generating interest for several reasons. One reason is that public-private partnerships and 
other multistakeholder arrangements have been shown to be effective ways to address complex, 
dynamic problems that exceed the capacity of a single sector or actor. SIBs, if executed well, can spur 
cross-sector collaboration and cooperation.   
Another reason is that the government is already familiar with the concept of paying for results—
but has yet to apply it to social issues.2 With SIBs, all the financial risk involved in scaling up a 
social program rests with the investors who will be paid only if performance targets are achieved; 
government thus pays for results rather than paying for activities. SIBs can give government a 
risk-free way to transition from existing remedial efforts to higher-impact, less costly preventive 
solutions. 
*  Clyde Haberman, “Ex-inmate’s legacy: Victory over bias and catch-22 bureaucracy,” New York Times, August 29, 2008.
2 Governments at the city, state, and federal level use pay-for-performance contracts for construction projects, environmental 
cleanup, and other activities. In some cases, the contract includes a fixed payment coupled with a bonus for meeting specified 
performance targets. In other cases, contractors bear the financial risk: they must secure up-front working capital from investors or 
other sources to fulfill the contract, and they recoup their costs only if they meet performance targets.
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Funding what works—driving more dollars to high-performing nonprofits and their programs—
seems obvious but has not always been the reality in the social sector. The recent recession has 
focused funders and service providers on the need to do more with less and on the benefits of 
putting resources behind programs that have demonstrated success. The 2011 publication of 
Leap of Reason3 reignited the discussion of “managing to outcomes” and “results-based  
management.” SIBs build off this philosophy and reward those who have invested in developing 
programs and proving that they work. 
SIBs are also attracting interest because the community of “impact investors”—private founda-
tions, family offices, individuals, and others who use their investment capital not just to reap finan-
cial returns but to benefit society—is growing. Over the past 10 years, more investors have begun 
to let their values guide their financial investments, seeking ways to do well while doing good. 
Total benefits to society 
Much of the discourse on SIBs emphasizes the financial savings that government may realize by 
replacing more expensive remedial programs with less expensive preventive interventions. How-
ever, multiple funding streams, limited data systems, and lack of cross-agency coordination may 
inhibit government’s ability to fully recognize the financial savings from a SIB. While some stake-
holders describe this as more an accounting problem than a savings problem, in our view, SIBs 
are primarily a vehicle for scaling up a preventive program that delivers significant social impact 
rather than a reliable source of cost savings. 
In this report, we evaluate SIBs not on their savings potential for government budgets but on their 
broader benefits to society. We follow the lead of the Washington State Institute for Public Policy 
(WSIPP), which considers three groups—constituents, taxpayers, and what we will call “avoid-
ers”— when evaluating the costs and benefits of government-funded social programs.
Constituents—the direct recipients of the social services—experience tangible benefits (such as 
increased earnings) as well as intangible benefits (such as greater confidence in reintegrating into 
society). 
Taxpayers benefit because SIBs reduce the need for expensive services and infrastructure that 
taxpayers finance. For example, if offenders are served through community-based alternatives to 
incarceration, fewer prison beds are needed. When ex-offenders successfully reenter society, get 
jobs, and pay taxes, tax revenues increase.
Avoiders—or what WSIPP refers to as “nonparticipants in other nontaxpayer roles”—are  
individuals who benefit precisely because something does not happen that otherwise would  
have. People who would have been crime victims, for instance, will avoid the trauma of being 
victimized, the loss of property, or physical injury.4 
3 Mario Morino, Leap of Reason: Managing to Outcomes in an Era of Scarcity, Washington, DC: Venture Philanthropy  
Partners, 2011.
4 Steve Aos et al, “Return on investment: Evidence-based options to improve statewide outcomes,” Technical Appendix II Methods 
and User Manual, Washington State Institute for Public Policy, July 2011, p. 7. 
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Design choices for SIBs: The parameters we set for our research 
Stakeholders are debating and discussing different constructs for SIBs, and using inconsistent 
terminology to do so. For example, while the Obama Administration sticks to the term “pay for 
success” (PFS), other government actors use the terms SIB and PFS interchangeably; still others 
refer to SIBs as a type of PFS contract. Because of the range of perspectives, we realized we 
needed to create parameters for our research. We made the following assumptions as we studied 
how SIBs could work: 
The SIB’s impact is measured in total benefits to society—not just in immediate cash 
savings for the government. SIBs may result in measurable savings to government in the near 
term, but capturing the savings requires government agency coordination that may be difficult to 
orchestrate. Because there’s no guarantee such coordination will actually happen, we chose to 
focus on all the benefits—financial and social—that SIBs generate within a reasonable period of 
time (10 to 12 years). 
The SIB is for scaling proven—not promising—interventions. Simply because they are so 
new, SIBs carry risks—both in their structural model and in their execution—that cannot be entirely 
mitigated in the near term. Interventions carry risks as well. A SIB that focuses on proven interven-
tions carries primarily execution risk related to the intervention, whereas a SIB that seeks to scale 
up promising but unproven interventions carries both execution risk and model risk related to the 
intervention, and is much less likely to attract investment. While innovation and experimentation are 
undeniably valuable, we confined our research to SIBs that help scale up programs that have been 
shown to work.
 
The government enlists an intermediary to manage the SIB. Managing a SIB’s multiple 
stakeholders is a full-time job. For the purposes of our research, we assumed that the entity that 
provides the social services would be free to focus exclusively on its core competency—service 
provision—without also having to interact constantly with the government, investors, and other 
stakeholders. This third-party moderator would connect stakeholders, coordinate all the moving 
pieces, and replace underperforming service providers. 
 
Nonprofit organizations provide the services. Some government functions—road construc-
tion, for instance—can be effectively outsourced to the private sector. Whatever the long-term 
prospects for private provision might be, we expect that nonprofit organizations will remain the 
leading providers of preventive interventions for homeless citizens or criminal offenders. Results 
for social programs are difficult to measure, and the work must be driven by the social bottom 
line, not just dollars and cents. Our research covers only SIBs in which nonprofits—not private-
sector entities—provide the services. 
 
HOW AND WHERE ARE SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS BEING USED TODAY?
The first SIB came into being in September 2010. After raising £5 million from philanthropic 
funders, Social Finance UK—a nongovernmental organization (NGO) that develops financing 
structures and raises capital to help fund social service organizations—launched a SIB to help 
rehabilitate 3,000 short-term prisoners at Peterborough Prison expected to be released over a 
six-year window. 
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5 David Ainsworth, “Two new social impact bond-style investments launched,” Third Sector Online, January 24, 2012. 
6 Kaye Wiggins, “Office for Civil Society to trial £40m social impact bond scheme to support ‘problem families’,” Third Sector Online,  
August 26, 2011. 
7 “NSW government announces joint development phase for social benefit bonds,” March 20, 2012 (treasury.nsw.gov.au).
8 “Supporting families and communities,” chapter 3.4, Jobs growth and long-term prosperity: Economic action plan 2012, Government  
of Canada, March 29, 2012 (budget.gc.ca).
9 “Transforming public services,” chapter 1, Strong action for Ontario: 2012 Ontario budget, Ontario Ministry of Finance, 2012 (fin.gov.on.ca).
10 See socialinnovationbc.ca.
Under the SIB contract, four UK nonprofits—St. Giles Trust, Ormiston Trust, the YMCA, and  
Supporting Others through Volunteer Action—are implementing programs to help inmates  
increase their education levels, vocational skills, and confidence both during and after  
confinement. The reoffending rate of the Peterborough prisoners will be measured against  
a control group of 30,000 short-term prisoners from other jails who are not receiving these  
preventive support services. If reoffending rates among the Peterborough prisoners drop by 7.5 
percent, investors get a minimum payout of 7.5 percent; if reoffending rates are even lower the 
payout could increase up to 13.5 percent. However, if these outcomes are not achieved, the  
investors will lose their entire investment. (Interim results on reoffending rates and investment  
payments won’t be available until 2014). 
The SIB model is also being applied by the UK Department for Work and Pensions as part of a 
£30 million Innovation Fund, set up to attract private investment to tackle the problems faced by 
disadvantaged youth.5  Some local county councils in the United Kingdom are pursuing SIBs that 
total up to £40 million to scale programs for communities and families.6 
 
Global interest 
Although the United Kingdom is the only country currently hosting a SIB, other countries are tak-
ing notice. Social Innovation Europe, an initiative of the European Commission, has commissioned 
a report on SIBs. In Australia, the New South Wales government is in the development phase for 
three SIBs or, as they are being called in Australia, “social benefit bonds” in the areas of recidivism 
and out-of-home care for children.7  
One NGO that focuses on Middle Eastern issues has established a task force to assess the  
potential of SIBs. The Portland Trust, an organization seeking to promote peace between Israel 
and Palestine, is determining whether SIBs could be successful in economic-development  
projects in the Middle East.
Canadian federal and provincial governments are also exploring whether SIBs are right for them. 
The 2012 federal budget mentions plans to test SIBs “to further encourage the development of 
government-community partnerships.”8  Ontario will “encourage improved outcomes at a lower 
cost by transforming traditional approaches to the delivery of services” through SIB pilots in a 
number of program areas over the next 18 months.9  The British Columbia Advisory Council on 
Social Entrepreneurship, established by the provincial parliament, has drafted a recommendation 
to pilot SIBs as a way to foster public-sector innovation.10  
 
SIBs in the United States 
In the last year, US local and state governments have been exploring SIBs and a broader array 
of PFS models. Early interest in SIBs has focused on two social issues: chronic homelessness 
and criminal and juvenile justice. SIB uptake will likely occur in places where those two issues are 
among a governor’s or a mayor’s current priorities. 
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11 “Massachusetts first state in the nation to pursue ‘Pay for Success’ social innovation contracts,” Executive Office for Administration 
and Finance, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, January 18, 2012 (mass.gov/anf).
12 Fiscal year 2013 budget of the US government, Office of Management and Budget, The White House, 2012, p. 45  
(whitehouse.gov/omb).
Massachusetts is a case in point. At the top of Governor Deval Patrick’s agenda is the problem of 
homelessness: he has made a $38.5 million commitment to overhaul the emergency-assistance 
program and move homeless people into apartments or congregate care. Massachusetts is 
focusing one of its first SIB pilots on homelessness. Pursuant to a June 2011 request for informa-
tion, in January 2012 the state government sought two submissions from service providers and 
two from intermediaries in the areas of chronic homelessness and juvenile justice. For the former, 
the goal is twofold: to provide stable housing for several hundred chronically homeless people 
and reduce housing and Medicaid costs. In the juvenile justice pilot, the administration wants to 
reduce recidivism and improve education and employment outcomes for a significant number of 
the 750 youths who leave probation systems and juvenile correction facilities each year.11 
Elsewhere in the country, a number of cities and states—including New York City and the states of 
Connecticut, New York, and Michigan—are actively exploring SIBs. That said, most jurisdictions 
that have indicated an interest in SIBs are still a long way from launching one. 
At the federal level, there has been some activity as well. In October 2011 the White House Office 
of Social Innovation and Civic Participation convened a forum called “Pay for Success: Invest-
ing in What Works,” at which SIBs were discussed. President Obama has signaled his support 
of PFS pilots by seeking congressional authority to reserve up to $100 million in his 2012 budget 
for a number of program areas including workforce development, education, juvenile justice, and 
care of children with disabilities. President Obama proposed extended availability for PFS funds 
to allow longer disbursement periods; he also requested permission to redirect PFS funds that are 
not used to make results-based payments. Congress rejected the president’s proposal, but in the 
meantime the administration has launched PFS pilots that meet the current statutory guidelines. 
Over the course of 2012, the administration is running PFS pilots in criminal justice and workforce 
development through the Departments of Justice and Labor, respectively. President Obama’s  
proposed 2013 budget includes up to $109 million to test PFS in a broader range of program 
areas including education and homelessness.12 
At this time, we are unable to project the aggregate dollar value of potential SIB deals nationally, 
nor can we reliably estimate the related taxpayer benefits. Doing so would require an accurate 
prediction as to the unique terms and economics of each potential deal. But to show how the 
economics of a SIB might work, we prepared a pro forma analysis of a SIB focused on juvenile 
justice. We devote Chapter 4 to that analysis.
A SIB is a new approach for expanding successful social 
programs.  It is a partnership in which private investors  
— not governments—provide capital for nonprofits to scale 
up. The government pays only if the program succeeds.
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To develop a more precise understanding of how SIBs could work, we conducted in-depth 
analyses of two social issues—homelessness and criminal justice—that experts repeatedly told 
us could benefit tremendously from SIBs. Both issues matter to the public, and both are areas in 
which federal, state, and local government in the United States spends several billion dollars on 
remedial programs but much less on preventive programs. These are also areas in which behavior 
change interventions—a category of interventions with limited alternative approaches for scaling, 
and where SIBs can be an especially powerful tool—are most prominent.
Our intention in undertaking these analyses was to test the utility of SIBs and provide a fact base 
for stakeholders considering whether to use this new social innovation tool. Our goal was to as-
sess whether SIBs could potentially work in these two program areas—not to recommend that 
SIBs necessarily be applied. We structured our analyses around four key questions that must be 
answered before the launch of any SIB—before partners are assembled and the important busi-
ness of relationship building begins. We also identified specific challenges for SIBs in the areas of 
homelessness and juvenile and criminal justice.
•  Are the current remedial costs on a scale that makes the economic savings generated 
by substituting a preventive solution meaningful? SIBs can create taxpayer benefits by 
scaling proven preventive interventions that cost less than the remedial programs they replace. 
The difference in cost between the more expensive remedial program and the less expensive 
preventive program represents the upper limit of the taxpayer benefits SIBs can deliver. We 
note that preventive interventions scaled through SIBs will not entirely eliminate the need for all 
remedial programs. That said, to get a sense of the magnitude of a SIB’s potential, we estimat-
ed the current costs of existing remedial programs. Because structuring and managing a SIB 
takes time and effort, some threshold of taxpayer benefits needs to be met to justify using a 
SIB. That threshold will vary by case but is an important consideration when deciding whether 
to use a SIB.
•  Are there proven preventive interventions to help the target population? We studied the 
range of preventive interventions and looked for objective evidence of efficacy.13   
•  Are there service providers who can scale these interventions? Without competent ser-
vice providers to deliver the preventive interventions, the entire SIB structure is for naught. We 
looked for healthy and stable nonprofit service providers with strong core operations, familiar-
ity with the relevant intervention, and the capacity to scale.
•  Is there a meaningful number of constituents who could be served? A SIB’s structure 
involves several actors, each charging a fee or expecting a return. As a result, it is a more 
complicated and expensive way to scale programs than if government simply contracted 
directly with a service provider. To justify using a SIB—and to make the economics of the 
SIB structure work due to the additional costs involved—the SIB must benefit a meaningful 
13 312 effective programs received at least one of the following ratings from the seven registries in the United States: from the 
Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy’s Social Programs That Work—Top Tier, Near Top Tier, Promising; from Blueprints for Violence 
Prevention at the Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence, Institute of Behavioral Science—Model Program, Promising 
Program; from Promising Practices Network—Proven, Promising; from Child Trends’ Lifecourse Interventions to Nurture Kids 
Successfully—Effective; from Communities That Care—Effective; from the Office of Justice Programs’ CrimeSolutions.gov—Ef-
fective, Promising; and from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention’s Model Programs Guide—Exemplary, 
Effective, Promising. 
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number of constituents. What that number ought to be will vary by case. To arrive at estimates 
of the size of the constituent population in homelessness and criminal justice, we studied the 
relevant government data, academic research, and other publicly available sources.
In this chapter, we discuss the answers to these four questions, first for chronic homelessness 
then for juvenile and criminal justice. (We tackle the questions in a different order for each pro-
gram area, beginning with those on which we found the most reliable data.) We also lay out the 
challenges stakeholders can expect to encounter as they seek to scale preventive interventions in 
each of these areas. This analysis is not intended to recommend whether SIBs are the right tool 
to address challenges in homelessness, juvenile and criminal justice, or any other area of social 
welfare. Rather, the goal was to test SIBs’ potential, should stakeholders decide to pursue them.
COMBATING CHRONIC HOMELESSNESS
On any given night, more than 600,000 people in the United States are homeless.14 While  
homeless people face different struggles, most share an inability to secure affordable housing.  
A subset of the total homeless population is “chronically homeless,” which the federal govern-
ment defines as “an unaccompanied homeless individual with a disabling condition, or a family 
with at least one adult member who has a disabling condition who has either been continually 
homeless for a year or more OR has had at least four episodes of homelessness in the past three 
years.”15 While chronically homeless people account for a minority of the total homeless popula-
tion—there were approximately 110,000 chronically homeless persons in the United States in 
2010—they require significant services from federal, state, and local systems. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, chronic homelessness is one of the two issues that the Commonwealth of  
Massachusetts has chosen to address through social innovation financing. 
Doing the math:  
Estimating government spending on remedial homeless programs  
To understand current funding streams for homeless programs, we reviewed federal reports and 
agency Web sites and conducted expert interviews. We looked at federal, state, and local govern-
ment spending on emergency and transitional shelters. Whenever possible we excluded spend-
ing on preventive programs such as Permanent Supportive Housing (PSH) interventions or rental 
voucher programs. We did not examine spending from other sources such as foundations or 
individuals. 
Programs serving the homeless population at the federal level fall into two categories: targeted 
programs and mainstream programs.
 Targeted programs cater specifically to homeless individuals or families. We relied on the US 
Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH) for federal spending estimates on homeless 
programs, and then used state and local matching ratios to calculate total government spending 
14 The 2010 annual homeless assessment report to Congress, US Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2010  
(hudhre.info/documents/2010HomelessAssessmentReport.pdf).
15 “Notice of funding availability for the Continuum of Care Homeless Assistance Program,” US Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, 2010, p. 7 (hud.gov).
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nationally. Total spend on targeted remedial programs through the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department 
of Veterans Affairs (VA), and other government entities was approximately $3.1 billion in 2010.16 
Mainstream programs serve homeless people as well as a broader population. A number of 
mainstream programs—Medicaid, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), Supplemen-
tal Security Income (SSI), Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (Food Stamps), and Child 
Welfare—are the most important to the homeless population and were the focus of our research. 
We calculated Medicaid spending using both top-down (USICH data and state and local match-
ing ratios) and bottom-up approaches (segmenting homeless people into subpopulations and 
estimating per-person Medicaid expenditures for each subpopulation). We used only bottom-up 
approaches to calculate spending on TANF, SSI, Food Stamps, and Child Welfare. Our estimate of 
total government spending on homelessness through mainstream programs: between $2.5 billion 
and $3.6 billion in 2010.
Our estimate of combined federal, state, and local government spending on both targeted and 
mainstream remedial programs for homeless people was between $6 billion and $7 billion in 2010. 
For more detailed information behind these numbers, please consult the technical appendix on 
homelessness.
Evidence-based interventions: Permanent Supportive Housing  
Among the various approaches to addressing the needs of homeless people—approaches includ-
ing family reunification, subsidy, and behavioral and mental health interventions—PSH is one that 
is backed by a considerable body of research and evidence demonstrating its effectiveness. While 
we recognize that PSH is not the only solution to homelessness, we selected it as an example of a 
program that meets the eligibility requirements for scaling through a SIB (see seven SIB eligibility 
requirements below). 
PSH programs help homeless individuals live as independently as possible by giving them long-
term subsidized housing as well as supportive services including core case management, primary 
and mental health care, substance abuse treatment, and educational and vocational training. 
Although PSH is primarily intended to benefit people who are chronically homeless, mentally ill 
and “episodic” homeless people can also take advantage of it.
More than 20 studies have documented the efficacy of PSH, which is credited with reducing 
government spending, boosting housing-retention rates, and lowering substance abuse rates and 
recidivism.17 The four most frequently cited studies are as follows:
•  New York City: A landmark study examined 4,679 severely mentally ill homeless people 
placed in a PSH program. Result: significant declines in use of both shelters (86 percent in the 
treatment group versus 6 percent in the control group) and public hospitals (78 percent decline 
in the treatment group versus 53 percent in the control group).18 
16 Appendix to Opening Doors: Federal strategic plan to prevent and end homelessness: Update 2011, US Interagency Council on 
Homelessness.
17 Studies include analyses on interventions in Chicago, Cleveland, Denver, New Orleans, New York City, Philadelphia, San Diego,  
San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington DC; and in Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon, and Rhode Island.
18 “Public service reductions associated with placement of homeless persons with severe mental illness in supportive housing,” 
Dennis P. Culhane, Housing Policy Debate, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2002, pp. 107–63. 
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•  Chicago: The AIDS Foundation of Chicago, a consortium of 15 service providers, led a PSH 
intervention. Result: 29 percent fewer hospitalizations and 24 percent fewer ER visits than the 
control group.19 
•  Seattle: The Downtown Emergency Service Center led a PSH intervention focused on chroni-
cally homeless people with severe alcohol problems. Result: taxpayer savings of $4 million in 
the first year of operation with a target population of 95 people.20 
•  Massachusetts: The Massachusetts Housing and Shelter Alliance implemented a statewide 
“Home & Healthy for Good” program. Result: an 82 percent residential stability rate among 
participants and state government savings of approximately $9,600 per tenant.21 
We defined seven basic SIB eligibility requirements and tested how PSH stacks up against them.
19 “Effect of a housing and case management program on emergency department visits and hospitalizations among chronically ill 
homeless adults,” Laura S. Sadowski et al, Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 301, No. 17, 2009, pp. 1771–8.
20 “Health care and public service use and costs before and after provision of housing for chronically homeless persons with severe 
alcohol problems,” Mary E. Larimer et al, Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 301, No. 13, 2009, pp. 1349–57.   
21 Home & Healthy for Good: A statewide pilot housing first program: Progress report, Massachusetts Housing and Shelter Alliance, June 
2011.
 
A SIB-funded intervention must… 
 
Focus on prevention 
 
Have a multi year track record (at least five years) 
 




Deliver statistically significant results
Meet the needs of a sizable population
 
Be replicable and scalable
 
Deliver taxpayer benefits in less than five years 
 
PSH fits the bill because… 
 
It is a preventive solution 
 
It has been in existence for more than 20 years 
 
Multiple studies have shown efficacy of PSH  through 
randomized control trials or quasi-experimental  
designs (e.g., Chicago, New York, Seattle) 
 
Multiple studies have shown that PSH yields benefits 
such as higher housing stability rates  
 
There were more than 110,000 chronically homeless 
persons in the United States in 2010 
 
PSH has been successfully implemented in  
multiple states  
 
Some PSH programs help government realize  
cost savings in their first year of operation
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We use PSH here to illustrate how SIBs can help scale a proven solution to a persistent social 
problem—not to promote PSH as the single most effective intervention for addressing chronic 
homelessness. In fact, experts on homelessness point out that the availability of housing units 
will not necessarily end homelessness. In the words of Muzzy Rosenblatt, executive director of 
Bowery Residents’ Committee, “Homelessness is as much, if not more, an issue of behavior and 
health, poor choices and education, and simple but extreme poverty.” Options other than PSH 
may be a better solution for some homeless individuals, and may even cost less than PSH. How-
ever, PSH is an example of an approach that has been studied extensively and meets the other 
SIB criteria we described earlier.
Qualified service providers are available 
The delivery of the preventive intervention is crucial to a SIB’s success. If the intervention is not imple-
mented competently and well, the entire SIB structure will be for naught. Service providers need to be 
healthy and stable organizations with strong core operations, a familiarity with the relevant interven-
tion, the capacity to scale, and the willingness to be part of the great SIB experiment.
Service provider capacity does not appear to be a problem for scaling up PSH, as there are many 
competent PSH providers. In 2010 HUD provided Continuum of Care grants to 3,200 PSH provid-
ers, of which 200 received more than $1 million in funding—suggesting that these organizations 
are big enough to be able to scale up PSH programs.22 
A meaningful number of constituents 
In 2010, of the 197,600 people who were either currently or formerly chronically homeless, only 
44 percent (87,600 individuals) were benefiting from preventive interventions such as PSH.23 The 
remaining 56 percent (110,000 people) were on the streets or in emergency housing.24 Helping all 
chronically homeless people, therefore, would require a doubling of the capacity of preventive  
interventions. Together, the states of New York, Louisiana, Texas, Florida, and California account 
for 55 percent of the chronically homeless population; efforts to scale up prevention programs 
might therefore be concentrated in those states. 
Challenges in scaling PSH through SIBs 
Successful scaling requires delivery of a proven intervention with fidelity. At the same time, adap-
tation and innovation are crucial to ensuring that the intervention is relevant and effective when 
applied to new populations and changing circumstances. (For a concrete example of changing 
circumstances, see “How will changes in Medicaid affect PSH?” on p.27) The focus of delivering 
with fidelity will vary for every intervention: in some cases, the “secret sauce” is the core content, 
while in others it is the experience or process of delivery that matters most. Codification of a pro-
gram’s key components, rigorous staff training, ongoing monitoring, and quality control will help 
service providers stay true to the fundamental principles of the intervention as they scale it. 
22 FY 2010 Continuum of Care Grants Awards for all states and District of Columbia, US Department of Housing and Urban  
Development (hud.gov).
23 Based on estimate that ~37 percent of 236,798 Permanent Supportive Housing beds are used by chronically homeless, The 2010 
annual homeless assessment report to Congress, US Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2010, p. 41 (www.hudhre.info/
documents/2010HomelessAssessmentReport.pdf). 
24 The 2010 annual homeless assessment report to Congress, US Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2010, p. 8 (www.
hudhre.info/documents/2010HomelessAssessmentReport.pdf).
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To effectively adjust a program, implementers need knowledge of the target constituents and 
community. This knowledge can provide guidance as to how to adapt an intervention to local 
nuances: service providers may need to adjust the order in which they present an intervention’s 
modules, for instance, or the vocabulary or examples they use to convey content. 
Service providers and other SIB stakeholders should keep in mind the following success factors 
for scaling PSH interventions with the support of a SIB: 
Local knowledge. Providers should establish relationships with and links to local community 
stakeholders such as housing agencies, hospitals, care centers, property developers, and prop-
erty managers. Local stakeholders understand their constituents’ needs and the community’s 
attitudes much more than outside groups that “parachute in.” They know where services (public 
transportation and supermarkets, for example) are located, making them better able to identify 
ideal sites for PSH structures. 
Multifaceted expertise. Because PSH is a holistic approach to solving chronic homelessness, 
service providers must have skill sets across a range of areas, including property management 
and case management.
Cross-agency collaboration. The government departments that fund PSH interventions are 
often not the same ones that receive the financial benefits when chronic homelessness drops. For 
instance, the funding for a program may come from HUD, but the savings that the program yields 
may benefit HHS (through a reduction in Medicaid expenditures). Cross-agency collaboration is 
important to the success of SIBs.
 
How will changes in Medicaid affect PSH?  
 
 
Chronically homeless people are among the highest-
cost users of health services. Medicaid accounts for a 
significant portion of mainstream program spending for 
homeless people. Today, when a chronically homeless 
person is in a PSH program, managed care organizations 
can more easily enroll him or her in a Medicaid plan.  
An increase in managed care enrollment can save state 
governments money: the fixed monthly fee of managed 
care plans replaces the high costs of uncompensated 
health care.
In 2014, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) will extend 
Medicaid eligibility to all chronically homeless people, 
whether or not they are in PSH programs. While this 
change may yield many social benefits, it may disrupt  
the current PSH ecosystem and have implications  
for SIBs. Under this new law, current health care 
providers for the homeless will have higher operating 
costs. Indeed, they will be required to get licensed  
to be eligible for Medicaid funding and will need to  
accommodate Medicaid enrollment and  
reimbursement procedures. More healthcare providers 
will also be eligible for Medicaid reimbursement  
for treating chronically homeless people.  
It’s unclear exactly how the ACA will impact the PSH 
service-delivery model and any SIBs intended to scale 
PSH. Stakeholders should recognize that Medicaid 
and other payment streams may shift over time and 
explore ways to make SIBs work under changing 
conditions.  
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Local buy-in. Implementing a PHS intervention without involving the local community could result 
in a major backlash (“Not in my back yard”). 
Availability of robust data. Measuring PSH outcomes will not be done through comparison with 
a control group and will, instead, most likely be based on pre- and postcost analyses of public-
service utilization. Such analyses depend on the availability of robust administrative data collected 
by government. This may be a challenge to SIBs focused on PSH and must be addressed by 
stakeholders as the SIB structure is designed.
 
JUVENILE AND ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE
The first-ever SIB, currently being implemented in the United Kingdom, is focused on criminal jus-
tice. Its goal: reduce recidivism by treating substance abuse issues, securing housing, and improv-
ing the education, skills, and confidence of the incarcerated both during and after confinement. 
We looked at the two systems that deal with correctional supervision and incarceration: the juvenile 
and adult criminal justice systems. The former seeks to rehabilitate offenders who are under the 
legal adult age (which varies by state); it attempts to help young offenders overcome the problems 
that led to their delinquent behavior and avoid further run-ins with the law. The latter oversees 
the arrest, imprisonment, probation, and parole of adult offenders. We investigated the barriers or 
enabling factors that could influence the implementation of SIBs in this program area in order to 
provide a fact base for stakeholders considering whether to use SIBs.
A meaningful number of constituents 
At least one million prison inmates, including approximately 100,000 juveniles, could be  
candidates for alternatives to incarceration. Some individuals who are not in prison—at-risk  
youth, for example—could also qualify as constituents.
In 2007 (the most recent year for which data are available), almost 100,000 youth were  
incarcerated, more than half of whom were serving time for nonviolent offenses such as technical 
violations25 or public order, property, and drug offenses. Not all the 100,000 youths can necessar-
ily receive interventions in the community safely, but this group can be screened and appropriate 
candidates identified.      
As for adult prisoners, more than 900,000 are in jail for drug-related offenses; approximately  
1.6 million have a mental health or substance abuse disorder.26  Among this latter group, less than 
half have received any professional treatment. More specifically:
• 11 percent have received treatment for substance abuse since admission27  
• 27 percent have received treatment for mental health issues since admission28  
• 35 percent of conditionally released offenders with substance abuse disorders received  
 any form of addiction treatment29
25 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Census of juveniles in residential placement, 1997–2010; Bureau  
of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (albany.edu/sourcebook). Includes status offenses.
26 The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University (NCASA), Behind Bars II: Substance  
abuse and America’s prison population, February 2010, p. 26.
27 NCASA, Behind Bars II, p. 4.
28 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Mental health problems of prison and jail inmates, September 2006. Mental health problems  
are defined more broadly than mental health disorders, including history or symptoms meeting medical criteria.
29 NCASA, Behind Bars II, p. 58.
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A subset of the 1.6 million inmates with mental health or substance abuse disorders may be  
candidates for community-based alternatives to incarceration. 
These numbers reflect the uppermost limits on the constituent population, since community-
based treatment programs will not be appropriate for all these individuals. Risk assessment  
models—such as the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide—can be used to determine who should  
remain incarcerated and who could receive treatment in a community-based program.30  
Evidence-based interventions: Youth and adult therapies  
To identify the evidence-based interventions for juvenile and adult offenders that would make the 
most sense for SIBs, we studied all the registries of evidence-based programs focused on these 
fields.31 We identified six programs that meet the criteria for SIBs and are community-based  
preventive interventions. These programs offer an alternative to incarceration (ATI) and seek to 
monitor and rehabilitate court-involved individuals through programs and services delivered  
outside prisons and jails. 
Youth therapies. There have been many rigorous evaluations of juvenile justice interventions. 
These evaluations have identified a number of therapeutic interventions that have yielded robust 
and sizeable effects on recidivism and other social outcomes. Three of the four interventions 
detailed below have demonstrated approximately a 50 percent effect on recidivism and have been 
widely adopted.
30 The Violence Risk Appraisal Guide, which predicts violent recidivism based on 12 measurable factors from an individual’s personal, 
criminal, and substance abuse history, has been validated in multiple small-group studies.
31 The registries we studied included Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy; Blueprints for Violence Prevention at the Center for 
the Study and Prevention of Violence, Institute of Behavioral Science; Promising Practices Network; Child Trends’ Lifecourse 
Interventions to Nurture Kids Successfully; Communities That Care; Office of Justice Programs’ CrimeSolutions.gov; Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention’s Model Programs Guide; and Washington State Institute for Public Policy. Additional 
registries of evidence-based programs we consulted that focus on other program areas include the Campbell Collaboration and 
the Cochrane Collaboration, which are health-oriented, internationally focused, and include meta-analysis of related programs. 




32 “Evidence summary for multidimensional treatment foster care (MTFC),” Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy   
(evidencebasedpolicy.org/docs/MultidimensionalTreatmentFosterCare.pdf).
33 Scott W. Henggeler, “Efficacy studies to large-scale transport: The development and validation of multisystemic therapy programs,” 
Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, Vol. 7, April 2011, pp. 351–81.
34 James Alexander, Bruce Parsons, Christie Pugh et al, Functional Family Therapy: Blueprints for Violence Prevention, Book Three, 
Blueprints for Violence Prevention series, Delbert S. Elliott, ed., Boulder, CO: Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence, 
Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado, 2000.
35 José Szapocznik and Robert A. Williams, “Brief strategic family therapy: Twenty-five years of interplay among theory, research and 
practice in adolescent behavior problems and drug abuse,” Clinical Child and Family Psychology Review,  















Brief Strategic Family 
Therapy (BSFT)
Description
Rather than living in a 
group home with other 
youth offenders, youths 
are placed with specially 
trained foster families 
where they learn to accept 
rules and limits; build 
skills; and develop appro-
priate social behavior. 
 
Parents learn to monitor 
and discipline their  
children so the family can 
stay together. Trained 




This short-term (8-12 
sessions) prevention or 
intervention treatment  
for troubled youths 
focuses on entire family 
functioning. 
 
Developed for Hispanic 
families and now used 
among diverse ethnic 
populations, it targets 
kids aged 6-17 and their 
families in 12-16 weekly 
sessions.
Evidence that it works
Two randomized  
controlled trials (RCTs) on 
girls showed a 40-50% 
decline in criminal refer-
rals and pregnancies. One 
RCT on boys showed 




Three studies  
demonstrate  
approximately 50%  
declines in criminal  
referrals.33   
 
 
More than 10 studies  
found a 25-60% decline  




Multiple studies show 
declines in measured 
conduct disorder,  
aggression, and drug 
use among participating 
youth.35 
Is it right for a SIB?
Maybe: Foster parents  
will need to receive special 
training, so the interven-
tion may not be easily 





Maybe: It may not pay 
for itself through taxpayer 
benefits. It also incurs a 





Yes: Its wide use suggests 




Maybe: It has been shown 
to work with the com-
munities for which it was 
designed, but it may 
not meet the needs of a 
broader population and 
may not be easily  
replicable and scalable.  
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To avoid incarceration, 
participants agree to 
attend a comprehensive 
court-monitored drug 
treatment program that 
may offer employment, 
mental health and family 
services. 
 
Prisoners receive reduced 
prison terms if—and 
only if—they complete 
a chemical-dependency 
treatment program. 
Evidence that it works 
 
A five-year examination of 
23 drug courts in 8 states 
found that these courts 
significantly reduced drug 
use and criminal behavior 
of participants compared 
to similar offenders.37  
 
 
There was an approxi-
mately 30% decline in 
3-year recidivism rates 
among drug offenders.38  
36 It‘s about time: Aging prisoners, increasing costs, and geriatric release, Vera Institute of Justice, April 2010 (vera.org).
37 Christine H. Lindquist, Michael Rempel, John K. Roman, Shelli B. Rossman, and Janine M. Zweig, The multi-site adult drug court 
evaluation, Urban Institute Justice Policy Center, 2011.
38 Washington’s Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative: An evaluation of benefits and costs, Washington State Institute for Public 
Policy, January 2005.
Select adult  interventions
Is it right for a SIB?
 
Maybe: cooperation 





tion would need to be 
enacted and judges 
would need to agree 
to refer inmates to the 
program. 
Adult therapies. While there is real interest in moving—and keeping—juvenile offenders out of 
traditional correctional facilities, there has been less activity and rigor in evaluating alternatives to 
adult incarceration. Still, there are some promising findings. Substance abuse treatment programs 
like drug courts have demonstrated approximately a 25 percent effect on recidivism; certain 
mental health treatment programs have also yielded encouraging results. Behavioral therapies for 
teenagers have been successfully administered to young adults between the ages of 18 and 25. 
In our view, two interventions in particular warrant further evaluation: drug courts and Washington 
state’s Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative. 
Because age is the greatest predictor of the risk that an inmate poses to society (the younger the 
inmate, the more likely he is to pose risk),36 a long-term inmate who has reached age 55 or older 
in incarceration, for example, might be a good candidate for an ATI program. This requires some 
additional research by the criminal justice field to determine.
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Substance and  










Expenses >$2 million,  
>50 FTEs2, and  
government funding  
>$1 million 
 
Expenses >$2 million  
and >50 FTEs**
 
Expenses >$2 million 
All providers 
There are only 27 providers in this 
category meeting all 3 criteria 
Purpose of organization:  
 
* National Center for Charitable Statistics. 
** Full-time equivalents. 
Qualified service providers are available 
To find qualified service providers, we examined tax-return data from the Urban Institute’s  
National Center for Charitable Statistics. We looked for providers that met three criteria: the  
organization reported annual expenses of at least $2 million, employs more than 50 full-time 
equivalents, and received more than $1 million in estimated annual government funding. We  
identified 153 youth-services providers39  and 252 providers focused on substance abuse and 
mental health treatment (Exhibit 2.1).40 
Exhibit 2.1: The number of juvenile and criminal justice service providers meeting scale criteria
39 There were 153 providers that met our scale criteria and whose National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities core classification was listed 
as “children and youth services” or “family counseling” (The Urban Institute National Center for Charitable Statistics, Core Files, 
P30 and P46, 2009).
40 Providers that met our criteria and whose National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities core classification was listed as “substance abuse 
dependency, prevention and treatment,” “substance abuse treatment,” or “residential, mental health treatment” (The Urban Institute 
National Center for Charitable Statistics, Core Files, F20, F22, and F33, 2009).
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Doing the math:  
Estimating government spending on criminal justice  
To estimate government spending on juvenile and adult criminal justice, we focused on the cor-
rections components: all correctional and confinement institutions that hold prisoners for more 
than 48 hours, as well as probation activities, parole and pardon boards and programs, and 
halfway houses. And because not all prisoners will be eligible for preventive interventions, SIBs 
can address only a fraction of current spending. Experts believe that preventive programs account 
for only a small share of current corrections spending. However, the lack of national statistics 
makes it very difficult to reliably estimate the savings potential of SIBs focused on criminal justice 
interventions. 
According to the most recent data available from the US Census Bureau, national corrections 
spending in 2007 was $74 billion.41 Of that total, spending on youths accounted for approximately 
10 percent ($7 billion to $8 billion), suggesting that average corrections spending per incarcerated 
youth and adult was approximately $80,000 and $30,000, respectively.42 
We are unable to estimate national remedial spending for specific subpopulations because the 
cost of incarceration for each individual varies, depending on three main factors. The first fac-
tor is the inmate’s health: the sicker the inmate, the higher the cost of care. The second factor is 
length of stay: the quicker an inmate leaves the system, the less the government has to spend on 
him or her—although day one is typically the most expensive due to required medical checkups, 
transportation, and administrative processing. The third factor is required security level: inmates 
deemed dangerous must be placed in more expensive facilities with higher supervision levels.
Incarceration costs also vary significantly by state. The complexity, scale, and heterogeneity of  
the juvenile and adult criminal justice systems make it impossible to issue blanket statements  
or generalizations about SIBs in these areas. Instead, each SIB intervention must be evaluated  
on a case-by-case basis.  
Challenges in scaling juvenile and criminal justice interventions with SIBs 
As with a SIB addressing chronic homelessness, delivery of the intervention is crucial to SIB 
success in the criminal justice area. A SIB will work only if the nonprofit service providers are well 
equipped to do their job and can successfully implement the program. This will be challenging 
in light of the fact that many nonprofits are under-resourced, and much of their financing comes 
from donors that stress project funding at the expense of strong organizational infrastructure. 
Securing critical buy-in. In any SIB, support from the government’s executive branch or from 
specific agencies is important—but for scaling up ATI programs, it is insufficient. No SIB focused 
on criminal justice will succeed without the support of judges, who would need to direct a suf-
ficient number of qualified participants into preventive programs in order for SIBs to achieve their 
constituent and economic targets within their preplanned time frames. 
41 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Justice Expenditure and Employment Extracts, 2007. 
42 See criminal justice technical appendix for our methodology for calculating youth-corrections expenditures. 
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Community-based alternatives for adult offenders can be politically unpopular with voters, and 
their implementation might depend on new legislation. Experts believe passing new legislation 
may not be as difficult as it seems, however; tightening government budgets may make such 
cost-saving proposals more palatable. 
 
 
Even in just the two areas we studied, there’s a vast difference in the availability of data and, 
consequently, in the nature of the conclusions we can draw. These differences underscore the 
importance of undertaking a detailed analysis for SIBs in each new program area before deciding 
whether this new approach should be implemented. 
In summary, chronic homelessness—with as much as $7 billion in remedial costs, approximately 
110,000 constituents, and a proven intervention in PSH—appears to be an area that could benefit 
from SIBs. There are a large number of PSH providers capable of scaling up, including many who 
have already received contracts with the federal government. We agree with the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts that homelessness is an issue where SIBs may be a suitable tool and deserve 
additional consideration.
In juvenile and adult criminal justice, a subset of the more than 50,000 incarcerated youth who 
are nonviolent offenders and the 1.6 million incarcerated adults with mental health or substance 
abuse disorders could receive treatment in community-based programs. Risk assessment models 
could be useful in identifying this subset. And there are proven interventions: we came across four 
for youth and two for adults. Although there aren’t enough providers focused exclusively on  
correctional alternatives, there are many at-scale providers capable of delivering preventive 
programs in areas like youth services and substance and mental health treatment. Government 
spending on national corrections is significant—$74 billion in 2007—although SIBs can address 
only a fraction of current spending since not all prisoners will be eligible for preventive programs. 
Still, the savings potential is meaningful. Again, this suggests SIBs may be an appropriate tool 
that deserves further evaluation.
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3. An assessment of the  
SIB ecosystem 
43 “Massachusetts first state in the nation to pursue ‘Pay for Success’ social innovation contracts,” Executive Office for Administration 
and Finance, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, January 18, 2012 (mass.gov/anf).
44 World Energy Council, “The concept of ESCOs,” chapter 3.6.1, Energy efficiency policies around the world: Review and evaluation, 
January 2008 (worldenergy.org).
A SIB is a multistakeholder collaboration. In this chapter, we take a closer look at the stakeholder 
groups—namely governments, investors, intermediaries, and evaluators—that will play critical 
roles if SIBs are to be adopted in the United States. (Constituents are important stakeholders as 
well but play a less active role. The remaining stakeholder group, nonprofit service providers, is 
discussed in Chapter 2 as part of our deep dives into the program areas of homelessness and 
criminal justice.) We describe the characteristics and capabilities each group must have to make 
a SIB successful, the challenges each is likely to encounter, and the ways they might overcome 
these challenges if they decide to pursue SIBs. Where possible, we give a few examples of actors 
either already engaging in SIBs or possessing the requisite attributes. 
We also studied the SIB ecosystem to determine whether capacity would be a constraint: are 
there enough players—or potential players—to make it possible for SIBs to become widespread 
in the United States? The answer seems to be yes.
 
GOVERNMENT: NO SUPPORT? NO SIB
Government can’t scale new social solutions alone. If it were single-handedly capable, there 
would be no need for a multistakeholder approach like SIBs. Moving from remedial programs to 
preventive solutions requires a public-private partnership to shift the risk from government and 
allow a transformation to occur in the current system. Governments are exploring SIBs precisely 
because complex social problems demand a multistakeholder solution. 
Government is the most critical stakeholder to SIB uptake—SIBs simply won’t happen without 
government participation. Indeed, in light of shrinking budgets, SIBs and other PFS constructs are 
capturing the attention of government decision makers. Our interviews with officials from the fed-
eral Office of Management and Budget (OMB); the states of Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, New York, Rhode Island, and Virginia; and the cities of Atlanta, Detroit, Louisville, 
Newark, and New York indicate that SIBs are generating energy and interest. 
The catalyst for SIB progress is executive leadership. The first-mover cities and states all have 
a mayor or governor who champions the SIB concept. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
for instance, with the full support of Governor Deval Patrick, is taking formal steps to establish a 
social innovation financing program focused on PFS contracts. “Social innovation financing is a 
tool that helps us tackle long-term social issues with innovative methods,” Governor Patrick said 
in a press statement. “These initiatives will help us change the delivery of state services to save 
money and improve program performance.”43  
Existing shared-savings programs in government already utilize performance-based contracting. 
Energy-service companies (ESCOs), for example, have been in the United States since the first oil 
crisis in the 1970s and are frequently utilized by the public sector. These private-sector enterprises 
address energy-management problems, improve building energy efficiency, reduce operating costs, 
and guarantee savings. When they enter into a shared-savings model, the ESCO and its client agree 
to share cost savings at a predetermined rate for a set number of years, but the ESCO takes on the 
performance and credit risk.44 Lessons learned from ESCOs can help inform SIB uptake.
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Through interviews, research, and analysis we have identified some of the considerations  
that cities and states would have to address if they choose to pursue SIBs. 
Bumps in the road—and potential solutions 
The government officials we interviewed identified a set of challenges that could impede SIB 
adoption. But they also had some concrete suggestions as to how governments interested in 
pursuing SIBs could overcome these challenges.
Fear of the unknown. Because there are currently no SIBs in the United States—and relatively 
little information on SIBs anywhere—governments are understandably hesitant to jump in.  
Overcoming the obstacle. Pilot efforts will go a long way toward clearing up questions and 
building momentum for SIBs. Pro forma analysis can also help illustrate how a SIB should work. 
Also, to minimize risks, the first SIBs should focus on proven interventions with a demonstrated 
evidence base. Only once the SIB approach becomes more familiar should promising programs—
those that have merit but less evidence behind them—be considered.
Delayed impact. Elected officials are in office for only a few years, and voters cast their ballots 
based on what’s happening now. The full benefits of SIBs won’t typically accrue for five or more 
years, and some of the budgetary savings may arise from future cost avoidance—for example, a 
decline in recidivism making the construction of a planned new prison unnecessary—as opposed 
to immediate cost savings in the current year’s budget. (See the pro forma analysis in Chapter 4, 
which illustrates a possible taxpayer-benefits path). Overcoming the obstacle. Focusing on the 
social impact and educating the public on the overall benefits to taxpayers won’t shorten the time 
SIBs take but will help manage expectations. Government can benefit from the efforts of academ-
ics, intermediaries, and advisers who are shaping the SIB discussion. They can help clarify that 
this new approach can scale social impact and rebalance government spending toward outcome-
based programs. They can also help set realistic expectations about whether SIBs will help save 
money and attract supplemental capital from private investors.
Business unusual. A SIB will likely touch multiple programs and agencies, and require coordina-
tion on terms and structure; agencies may resist giving up their power and autonomy. Another ex-
ample: current contracting mechanisms may lack the flexibility SIBs will demand—such as allow-
ing the SIB intermediary, not the government, to hire (and fire) the service providers. Overcoming 
the obstacle. At the discretion of the mayor or governor, a dedicated “super team” with central 
decision-making authority may be able to expedite the coordination needed across programs and 
agencies to make a SIB a reality. As for contracting, there will need to be some creativity: pilot 
programs of limited exemptions to regular rules, for example, can provide a solution. 
The federal government can also choose to play a critical role in helping shift the status quo to 
facilitate the uptake of SIBs. Because a significant amount of funding for social services starts in 
Washington and then flows to states and cities, the federal government is well positioned to incen-
tivize cross-agency collaboration, provide supplemental funding to defray assessment costs, and 
clear up misperceptions about SIBs. For example, OMB has clarified that state and local  
governments will not need any change in federal legislation to use federal dollars for SIB funding.45
45 Interview with Gary Glickman, coordinator of the Partnership Fund for Program Integrity Innovation at the Office of Management 
and Budget, and Kathryn Stack, deputy associate director of education and human resources, Office of Management and Budget, 
January 19, 2012.
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Difficulty in capturing benefits. Repaying investors from realized cash savings may require ag-
gregating SIB benefits across multiple agencies and programs as well as different levels of govern-
ment. This could prove challenging. In the case of homelessness, for instance, many groups—in-
cluding HUD, HHS, the VA, and state and local agencies—share funding responsibility for the care 
of a chronically homeless person. Overcoming the obstacle. A first step may involve ensuring that 
government data systems are capable of tracking cost and service utilization at the client level. In 
addition, the super team described above could be very helpful here as well. 
Stakeholders weigh in  
We asked nonprofit service providers, intermediaries, philanthropic funders, evaluators, academics, 
and other advisers knowledgeable about innovative social finance and evidence-based programs 
how they thought government would view SIBs, and what the hurdles might be to cities and states 
embracing this approach. 
When it comes to government’s goals for SIB participation, stakeholders’ opinions are divided. 
Some stakeholders predict government will participate in SIBs only if financial savings can be cap-
tured. Others believe government will embrace SIBs based on the social impact they can deliver, 
even if the financial savings cannot specifically be aggregated across agencies and realized. (The 
inability to capture savings when a less expensive preventive program replaces a more expensive 
remedial program has been characterized by Steve Goldberg at Social Finance US as an account-
ing problem rather than a savings problem.)  
Our stakeholder interviews also surfaced concerns that government officials dismissed. For exam-
ple, some thought there would be public backlash against SIBs as a “privatization” of government 
savings—that SIBs would be tantamount to giving government savings away to wealthy investors. 
Government officials we interviewed believe, however, that a well-managed communications pro-
cess would help avoid this issue. Another stakeholder concern was that a need for new legislation 
would hinder SIB uptake. But the government officials we interviewed feel SIBs are similar enough 
to the multiyear contracts that government already enters into and won’t require full-faith and credit 
legislation to back payments. (Investor demand will, of course, determine if this will turn out to be 
the case.) 
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* The control group will not receive services, but it also won’t be hurt by the SIB. In all likelihood, the control group will comprise 
individuals who were not receiving any preventive services to begin with. In addition, the SIB should strive as much as possible to 
avoid doing harm—even if the SIB fails.
 
PARTNERSHIP PROFILE: THE STAKEHOLDERS IN A SIB 
SIBs are partnerships. If SIBs happen, in order to function effectively, each of the seven stakeholder 
groups must do its part and work in collaboration with the others. 
Constituents are the program beneficiaries. They are the people who need the social services.  
What they’ll do: It depends. The constituents within the study group will receive the particular  
program or intervention. What they won’t do: If they are part of the control group, they won’t  
benefit from the intervention—but neither will they be hurt by it.*
Governments that choose to participate in SIBs are those looking to pay for results and drive more 
programming dollars to proven programs. What they’ll do: If they decide SIBs are worth pursu-
ing, enter into a contract with the intermediary and agree to performance targets designed by the 
independent assessor and evaluation adviser. What they won’t do: Pay investors if performance 
targets aren’t met.
Investors are the visionaries. They are foundations committed to innovative social finance, or 
impact investors eager to test a new funding approach. What they’ll do: Fund—via the intermedi-
ary—nonprofit service providers to deliver preventive programs. What they won’t do: Recoup their 
investment if the program fails to meet its targets. But they will get kudos for risk taking.
Nonprofit service providers are organizations capable of scaling up proven preventive interven-
tions over a multiyear period. What they’ll do: Contract with the intermediary so that they can get 
paid and get up and running, deliver services to constituents, and be open to evaluation from the 
independent assessor and evaluation adviser. What they won’t do: Shy away from being held  
accountable for outcomes or from working as part of a multistakeholder partnership.
The intermediary is an organization that has content expertise, financing skills, and project-
management capabilities. What it will do: Broker the deal among the government, the nonprofit 
service providers, and the investors; bring in the evaluation adviser and independent assessor; and 
manage all the moving parts throughout the SIB’s lifespan. What it won’t do: Settle for the status 
quo. The intermediary will always be on the lookout for ways to improve the program and deliver 
maximum results against performance targets.
The evaluation adviser will have specific content knowledge and experience with a range of as-
sessment methods. What it will do: Play a hands-on role, helping the intermediary and service 
providers iterate and adapt the intervention and make midcourse corrections based on ongoing 
assessment. What it won’t do: Remain detached and objective. The evaluation adviser is heavily 
invested in the project’s success.
An independent assessor is an evaluator that also has specific content knowledge and experi-
ence with a range of assessment methods. What it will do: Help set performance targets that can 
be objectively assessed and then review them to determine if investors get paid. What it won’t do: 
Participate in ongoing interpretation of performance results or advise service providers on to how 
to adapt the program. 
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INVESTORS: WHO WILL GET INVOLVED AND WHEN
The first SIBs in the United States are likely to attract two types of investors: philanthropic funders 
and so-called Impact First impact Investors.46  Both types are investors interested in pioneering 
innovative approaches and motivated by the social impact SIBs could generate. They are willing 
to take a higher level of risk. For that reason, they don’t necessarily represent the best test of what 
the market will bear in terms of government guarantees, rates of return, or even deal structure. 
Philanthropic funders, including foundations and individual philanthropists, are already sup-
porting SIB ecosystem development. These are funders committed to the social investing field 
and the development of evidence-based programs, or foundations committed to the social issues 
(including homelessness and criminal justice) that SIBs are likely to target. Foundations may want 
to support individual SIBs by defraying the costs of assessment, knowledge development, or 
technical assistance in the form of recoverable grants. (We note, however, that due to founda-
tions’ tightening budgets and recent cuts in evaluation dollars, SIBs will be competing with other 
program priorities for evaluation funding.) General ecosystem development and cost defrayment 
will probably be funded through traditional grants.
“Impact First” impact investors—foundations, family offices, qualified investors, and other 
institutions interested in maximizing social impact and willing to accept below-market financial 
returns—may also be interested in SIBs. The most likely participants will be foundations familiar 
with program-related investments (PRIs) and interested in SIB priority program areas. Early inves-
tors will have a high risk tolerance, and their return expectations will range from principal repay-
ment to returns that keep pace with inflation. These investors are looking not for a risk-adjusted 
rate of return but for repayment tied to social impact instead of to taxpayer benefits. They are 
putting their money down because impact matters most to them; they understand that realizing 
taxpayer benefits will be complicated. But given the novelty of SIBs, foundation investors will 
likely make PRIs from their annual budgets, not their endowments. 
As SIBs become more established, they may attract a third type of investor:
“Finance First” impact investors are foundations, family offices, qualified investors, and other 
institutions interested in market or near-market financial returns and a minimum level of social 
impact. Institutional and qualified investors are more likely to get involved than retail investors, 
though retail investors will be required to truly bring the SIBs to scale. Interest from Finance First 
investors will likely increase if SIB returns can be boosted by layering their investments on top of 
risk-absorbing, low-return-seeking philanthropic funding. Finance First investors are unlikely to 
get involved until multiple SIBs are on the market and the mechanism is well established. These 
investors could be right for a SIB fund of funds. Foundation investors that are Finance First are 
likely to invest from the mission-based investing allocation of their endowments.
Investors will understandably be hesitant to fund an untested model. SIBs’ multistakeholder con-
struct and the fact that repayment won’t come from an earned revenue stream may make some 
46 With support from the Rockefeller Foundation, Godeke Consulting is researching the SIB investor space and plans 
to share findings in 2012.
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investors queasy. Also, the program areas for first-wave SIBs—homelessness and criminal and 
juvenile justice—are not the conventional focus areas for impact investing (which have historically 
funded programs related to microfinance, fair trade, and eco-friendly product development). One 
way to raise investors’ comfort level would be to standardize SIBs through consistent structures 
and common templates, making it easier for investors to evaluate investment opportunities. 
Another way is to promote SIBs that scale proven (rather than promising) interventions. Finally, 
SIBs should be constructed in such a way that repayment is tied to the achievement of social 
outcomes as opposed to government savings. This is how the United Kingdom’s Peterborough 
Prison SIB is set up.
There are efforts under way to develop dependable sources of funding for SIBs and similar 
blended-value opportunities. For example, Big Society Capital in the United Kingdom—a “social 
investment bank” set up to transform the flows of capital into the social sector—is funded with 
$1 billion in equity, two-thirds of which comes from dormant bank accounts and one-third from 
banks. In the United States, leading funders are in discussions to form a “club” of investors com-
mitted to common impact-investing principles. 
 
INTERMEDIARIES: EXPERTS IN PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
Intermediaries manage a SIB throughout its entire life cycle. They must possess expertise in the 
relevant social issue, financing skills, and project management capabilities. Their content knowl-
edge must range from the strategic to the tactical: they must thoroughly understand the relevant 
program area, be familiar with social service delivery systems and impact assessment, and know 
the local actors. On the financing side, they must know how to conduct due diligence, raise 
capital from investors, and structure deals. (As SIB investors evolve from philanthropic to Impact 
First to Finance First, intermediaries’ capital-raising skills will need to evolve, too.) Within project 
management, intermediaries will need portfolio management and multistakeholder partnership 
experience. They will also need to be able to provide technical assistance and build capacity for 
service providers (for example, in areas like partnerships, scaling, and experience with the target 
community) and other SIB participants. And they will need a collaborative attitude, a willingness to 
participate in a high-profile partnership, and the fortitude to make hard choices—including hiring 
and firing service providers in order to ensure that program targets are met.
Two types of organizations appear to have the capabilities required to play the SIB intermediary role. 
One is established organizations designing and implementing programs and regranting funds 
in the area of community development. The second group consists of newly formed organiza-
tions specifically focused on SIBs. Social Finance US, for example, is a Boston-based nonprofit 
established in 2011. Its mission: to structure and manage innovative investment instruments that 
address the needs of government, nonprofit service organizations, and socially motivated investors 
and philanthropists. Currently, Social Finance US is entirely focused on being a fully integrated SIB 
intermediary.
If SIBs are to reach critical mass, however, more intermediaries will be needed. Three groups of 
actors have the potential to fill this role in the future. In the near term, financial players—more 
specifically, community development financial institutions (CDFIs) and community development 
venture capital funds—could become SIB intermediaries. Not all the organizations in this category 
are fully qualified, and it will be critical to work with the best of these organizations, which have 
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strong financing, project management, and portfolio management expertise—but even the best 
will need to build or acquire content expertise. 
As SIBs evolve, “content” players—organizations with both place-based and program-specific 
knowledge and strong ties to the local community (one example would be community founda-
tions)—could play a role. So too could intermediaries selected to manage the federal govern-
ment’s Social Innovation Fund. These include venture philanthropy funds, foundations, and other 
charitable organizations that can re-grant capital, raise matching funds, manage a portfolio of 
programs, and assess results. 
Single organizations are most likely to serve the intermediary role in the near term, but a vari-
ety of partnerships can be explored in the future. In a direct partnership, organizations with 
complementary capabilities—for instance, a CDFI and program area specialist—might join forces. 
Through a national facilitator partnership, national groups (such as the Corporation for Supporting 
Housing) would help spread SIBs by providing capacity building and ongoing technical assistance 
to local organizations that would serve as intermediaries. And in a national network model, local 
intermediaries would serve under a national brand.
 
EVALUATORS: TWO DISTINCT ROLES
Each SIB requires two evaluators to fulfill two distinct roles: one is an ongoing adviser to the inter-
mediary and the service provider, the other an arm’s-length auditor that assesses whether the SIB 
met its performance targets. We have coined the terms “evaluation adviser” and “independent 
assessor” to describe these two distinct roles. Qualified organizations will likely have very similar 
skill sets, equipping them to perform either evaluator function, but they will have to choose—and 
stick with—just one. 
The evaluation adviser’s involvement begins very early in the SIB’s life cycle. This adviser helps 
define performance targets, designs the assessment approach, monitors progress, and analyzes 
and interprets assessment results as a member of the working team. Unlike traditional evalua-
tors, who intentionally keep a certain distance from the intervention, the SIB evaluation adviser 
will work closely with the project team (composed of the service provider(s) and the intermediary), 
reviewing interim results and guiding corrective action when necessary.
The independent assessor plays a more traditional evaluator role, keeping an arm’s-length dis-
tance from the program intervention and maintaining objectivity. When the SIB is structured, the 
independent assessor signs off on the performance targets, confirming that they can be objective-
ly measured. The assessor then analyzes the results and reports if the SIB is achieving its target 
outcomes and whether the government is obligated to repay investors. The independent assessor 
will have a much higher-profile role than typical social sector program evaluators and must be will-
ing to bear the public scrutiny.  
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Primary qualifications for evaluating SIBs 
To evaluate SIBs—whether as an evaluation adviser or an independent assessor—organizations 
must fulfill three main requirements.
 Possess program area expertise. Ideal candidates will have specific content knowledge about 
the problem the SIB is addressing and be familiar with the evidence-based interventions in  
that space. 
 Demonstrate deep evaluation experience. Evaluators must have a proven track record of  
successfully evaluating social programs through their entire development cycle. They will have  
experience across the menu of assessment design, data collection, and data analysis options. 
They will also have familiarity with relevant government data systems. By tapping into their  
extensive networks, they will be able to build effective teams of internal and external experts. 
 Be ready and willing. Attitude is just as important as ability. SIB evaluators must be open to 
partnering with intermediaries and service providers.47  They must be comfortable with a high de-
gree of scrutiny and cannot be easily intimidated or afraid to evaluate a high-profile, public-private 
partnership that’s likely to garner significant media attention. Evaluators also need the organiza-
tional capacity to take on additional long-term engagements.
The American Evaluation Association, the primary professional association of evaluators, has  
approximately 7,300 members. The entire membership isn’t right for SIBs, but experts believe that 
at least eight major evaluation firms are appropriate and—just as important—interested in fulfilling 
this role.48  These firms share several characteristics: they are familiar with multiple program areas, 
have conducted evaluations across the country, possess broad expertise in measuring social  
outcomes, and have a track record of partnering with governments, academics, and nonprofit 
service providers. 
In addition, think tanks and policy institutes,49  experts at universities,50  and the evaluators select-
ed for programs supported by the Social Innovation Fund may also be able to serve as SIB evalu-
ation advisers. The bottom line, then, is that we don’t expect evaluator capacity to be an issue. 
Potential challenges to bear in mind 
Even with sufficient capacity, it may still be difficult to assess the programs SIBs help scale. Here,  
we flag four potential challenges that could affect evaluation and SIBs, and offer some ways to 
address them.
47 This skill set applies mostly to the evaluation adviser role.
48 Experts identified Abt Associates, American Institutes for Research, ICF Macro, Mathematica Policy Research, MDRC, RAND 
Corporation, Urban Institute, and Westat.
49 For example, the Vera Institute of Justice.
50 Such as Dennis Culhane at the University of Pennsylvania and Mary Larimer at the University of Washington.
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Challenges
Social impact assessment is still new. Great 
strides have been made over the past 30 years, 
but evaluators still struggle to apply evolving  
assessment methods to social programs. This 
problem isn’t specific to SIBs, but it will affect 
them.
 
Evaluation isn’t cheap. Because cash payments 
are tied to performance targets, SIBs demand rig-
orous evaluation. Assessment can be costly, and 
that cost will reduce the pool of taxpayer benefits 
available for investors and government. 
 
 
Cost-benefit analysis is key. Social sector  
evaluators may not have sufficient experience with 
the cost-benefit analyses critical to assessing SIB 
taxpayer benefits.
Cultural competency means the world. There 
is no one-size-fits-all solution—evaluators have to 
design and implement different assessments for 
diverse populations. 
Mitigation methods
Be flexible and creative. Randomized control  
trials won’t work for most SIB-funded programs. 
Evaluators will need to explore alternative mixed-
method approaches that still allow for comparison 
of the intervention group with a well-thought-out 
counterfactual. They will also need to keep evalua-
tion tools simple so as not to overburden the SIB.
Defray costs. Existing government data should be 
used as the benchmark or baseline for measuring 
the program’s comparison group (assuming govern-
ment has robust data available). Alternatively, evalu-
ators could seek funding from foundations or the 
federal government to defray assessment costs.
Boost capacity. Evaluation advisers and  
independent assessors could bring in external  
experts to supplement in-house analytical staff.
 
Enlist experts. Only specialists who know and 
understand specific target populations can create 
relevant assessment approaches—and properly 
interpret the results in context. 
Candid or contained? SIBs will be in the spotlight, and a variety of players—the media as well as different 
stakeholders—will want to know how the programs are progressing. While evaluation findings should be made 
publicly available in due course, midstream public reporting won’t be helpful. Complete transparency mid-inter-
vention could prevent the SIB from achieving its goals. Service providers and intermediaries need flexibility and 
breathing room to make changes based on ongoing monitoring—and such changes will be difficult to make if 
the intervention is under a public microscope and subject to constant scrutiny.
Are there enough players—or potential 
players—to make it possible for SIBs 
to become widespread in the United 
States? The answer seems to be... yes.
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ADDITIONAL ENABLERS: FACILITATING SIBS 
SIBs cannot become a reality without government, investors, evaluators, and intermediaries, but  
a number of other players are active and making things happen in the SIB ecosystem. 
Philanthropy. The Boston Foundation and The Pershing Square Foundation provided early fund-
ing to Social Finance US, helping to build its capacity as a SIB intermediary. The William and Flora 
Hewlett Foundation, Omidyar Network,51 and The Rockefeller Foundation52 are each developing 
multifaceted grant portfolios to fund the emerging SIB field. In addition, other foundations have 
supported McKinsey’s research effort on SIBs including the F.B. Heron Foundation,53 The Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation, and the W.K. Kellogg Foundation.
Advisers. Academics like Jeffrey Liebman, the Malcolm Wiener Professor of Public Policy at  
Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, are making important contributions.  
Liebman wrote Social impact bonds: A promising new financing model to accelerate social  
innovation and improve government performance (Center for American Progress, February 2011) 
and is currently advising the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as it explores pay-for-success 
social innovation contracts in chronic homelessness and criminal justice.
Jitinder Kohli is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress (CAP), a think tank in  
Washington, DC. Focusing on government efficiency, regulatory reform, and economic issues, 
Kohli authored “Financing what works: Social impact bonds hold promise,” (November 2010), a 
paper credited with introducing Washington thought leaders to social impact bonds. He continues 
to study this emerging field at CAP and recently co-wrote a brief examining SIBs and their value 
to government agencies: “What are social impact bonds? An innovative new financing tool for 
social programs” (March 2012). 
Other players: The Nonprofit Finance Fund (NFF) is a community development financial  
institution with 30 years of experience in helping to build the field of innovative social finance.  
In January 2011, the organization launched a Pay for Success (PFS) Learning Hub  
(payforsuccess.org) to share information and facilitate online discussion about SIBs. Open to 
everyone, the hub aims to be a go-to resource for information sharing about all things SIB-related. 
NFF also co-convened a learning and planning forum—“Pay for Success: Investing in What 
Works”—with the White House Office of Social Innovation and Civic Participation in October 2011 
and released a report on the forum in late January 2012.
Third Sector Capital Partners has stated its interest in working with service providers, funders/ 
investors, and government agencies and intends to assist in the launch of the SIB/PFS  
opportunity in the United States.
51 Omidyar Network supports innovative financial products with the potential for massive social impact. It is funding SIBs with 
investments in Social Finance UK (to develop other countries’ capacity to develop new SIBs) and Social Finance US (to structure 
the first SIB in the United States).
52 The Rockefeller Foundation funded Social Finance UK to develop the SIB concept and invested in the first pilot in Peterborough, 
England. In the United States, Rockefeller has funded the Nonprofit Finance Fund’s Pay For Success (PFS) Learning Hub, technical 
assistance to state and local governments, and a series of issue briefs, articles, and a White House forum to facilitate a bipartisan 
dialogue with federal policy makers on PFS.
53 F.B. Heron Foundation supports new enterprise finance tools (such as SIBs) that broaden the access of a wide range of social 
investors to build opportunities in the social sector.
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Our research into the SIB ecosystem and our analysis of the interest and ability of the various 
stakeholder groups—government, investors, intermediaries, and evaluators—have shown that 
there are competent players who can fulfill distinct roles and meet the specific requirements of 
SIBs. To be sure, stakeholders face many barriers, but there appears to be a large and growing 
pool of qualified participants. Capacity should not be a constraint for SIB progress.
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4. A pro forma analysis of a 
juvenile justice SIB
54 Created by the Washington state legislature in 1983 and based in Olympia, the Washington State Institute for Public Policy is a 
team of policy analysts, economists, university specialists, and consultants. It has studied the cost-effectiveness of state-run 
programs in high-priority areas including education, criminal justice, welfare, children and adult services, health, utilities, and 
general government. 
55 Results First helps states assess the true costs and benefits of public programs and fosters a decision-making environment that 
is driven by research and evidence. It is an initiative of the Pew Center on the States and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur 
Foundation, with additional support from the Annie E. Casey Foundation. It is currently partnering with Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, 
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, New Mexico, New York, Texas, and Vermont.
56 For example, in its analysis in the field of criminal justice, the Washington State Institute for Public Policy publishes the marginal 
cost of each kind of crime by government program and department. It then calculates an average of the total taxpayer benefits over 
the life of a program participant. This average is driven by an underlying model that accounts for which participants conduct fewer 
crimes, at which points in their lives, what the averted crimes are, and how these translate into reduced resource usage in each part 
of the criminal justice system.
To help stakeholders understand what they can and cannot expect from a SIB, we constructed an 
analysis of a hypothetical SIB. We sought answers to questions such as: what’s the potential for 
taxpayer benefits? How long will it take to pay back investors? What are the costs inherent in the 
SIB structure? Our analysis shows how one SIB could play out; it is not in any way representative 
of SIB economics in general. But we hope our analytical approach, the assumptions we made, 
and how we applied intervention data will inform the field’s understanding of how SIBs can be 
structured.
 
OUR SOURCE FOR INTERVENTION DATA
We knew that we would need to make a number of assumptions—but we wanted to anchor our 
analysis in the best possible intervention data. We relied heavily on analysis from the Washington 
State Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP),54  which conducts nonpartisan research on the effective-
ness of state-run programs in a variety of social welfare areas. Although WSIPP did not develop 
its estimates explicitly to be used as the basis for a SIB analysis, many of the programs WSIPP 
has examined meet our criteria for scaling with SIBs. (All of WSIPP’s analyses are based on costs, 
benefits, and other specifics for Washington state only.)
WSIPP has made state-of-the-art estimates of the likelihood that programs will achieve outcomes, 
the cost of service provision, and a program’s total benefits to society—including the benefits to 
taxpayers, constituents who participate in the program, and other members of society (see  
Chapter 1 for a more detailed description of total benefits to society). 
WSIPP’s analysis includes estimates of long-term taxpayer benefits per program participant. To 
estimate annual taxpayer benefits during the SIB life span, we used unpublished cash flow values 
from Pew’s Results First project, which is extending the WSIPP model beyond Washington state.55 
WSIPP also estimates how government spending fluctuates depending on the number of service 
recipients. This provides the long-run marginal costs of government remedial services. While 
these incremental costs can be substantially smaller than the average costs that other organiza-
tions tend to compute, they are enormously revealing, providing a more accurate picture of the 
government savings that are actually realized.56 
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TARGET INTERVENTION: FUNCTIONAL FAMILY THERAPY
We chose Functional Family Therapy (FFT) as the preventive intervention for our pro forma analy-
sis. FFT is a 12-week in-home family-oriented program delivered by trained therapists. It has a 
40-year track record and impressive reach—it is currently delivered at approximately 220 sites 
worldwide. It also boasts tremendous results: 13 studies document that over a 15-year period, 
youths participating in FFT had recidivism rates 25 to 60 percent57 lower than comparison groups. 
Furthermore, compared with other interventions that can be used with juvenile offenders—Multidi-
mensional Treatment Foster Care, Multisystemic Therapy, and Brief Strategic Family Therapy, for 
example—FFT has one of the highest ratios of taxpayer benefits (approximately $8,300 per youth) 
relative to the cost of service provision (approximately $3,200 per youth). WSIPP also estimates 
additional quantifiable benefits to society approximating $30,000; these include participant labor-
market earnings and averted victimization costs.58  
WSIPP charted the cost-benefit time path showing when the net taxpayer benefits generated by 
one program participant in FFT equal the costs of providing FFT. The program breaks even in year 
8, with positive net taxpayer benefits occurring in year 9 (Exhibit 4.1). 
57 James Alexander, Bruce Parsons, Christie Pugh et al, Functional Family Therapy: Blueprints for Violence Prevention, Book Three, 
Blueprints for Violence Prevention series, Delbert S. Elliott, ed., Boulder, CO: Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence, Institute 
of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado, 2000.
58 Washington State Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP) estimates are based on a meta-analysis of eight high-quality evaluations and 
are conservatively adjusted to account for imperfect research findings. WSIPP estimates that without treatment 72 out of every 
100 15-year-old youths on probation will recidivate within the next 15 years. The average effect across eight evaluations suggests 
that Functional Family Therapy reduces recidivism rates by almost a third (31 percent), which WSIPP adjusts down to 17 percent to 
account for imperfect research methods such as a lack of long-term follow-up.
Exhibit 4.1: This is the cost-benefit time path of one participant in Functional Family Therapy
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59 According to Washington State Institute for Public Policy calculations, it takes 8 years for the cumulative taxpayer benefits to equal 
the cost of delivering Functional Family Therapy (FFT) treatment to one program participant. Our 12-year time frame accounts for 
the SIB’s overhead costs and three successive waves of FFT participants.
UNDERSTANDING SIB ECONOMICS
The earliest SIBs will be under intense scrutiny. All involved will want to understand the economics 
of this new approach, how long the SIB will be in place, when performance milestones will occur, 
and when government can be expected to repay investors.
To understand the timing for investor repayment, we built off the cost-benefit time path for FFT 
alone and factored in administrative or overhead costs associated with SIB structuring. We imag-
ined a SIB that delivered FFT to a total of 4,500 youths over three years —one cohort of 1,500 
15-year-old youths per year. We made assumptions about the additional costs inherent in a SIB—
that is, the fees paid to the intermediary, evaluation adviser, and independent assessor. Factoring 
in these additional costs, the SIB needs to run until year 12 (nine years after the delivery of the 
FFT program) to generate a reasonable level of taxpayer benefits, creating savings for government 
and a return to investors. The result is a 12-year SIB that costs $16 million.59  Exhibit 4.2 lists the 
assumptions we made in our pro forma analysis.
9. Net savings Benefits to taxpayers remaining after cost of SIB – 
Term Definition Assumption 
2. Cost of service provision Delivering intervention (e.g., therapist, quality 
assurance, case management, court processing) 
Source: WSIPP1 estimates for delivering program to 913 participants 
in Washington state in FY2008 ($3,191 per participant) 
3. Cost of evaluation 
advisor 
Hands on  SIB role monitoring progress and 
suggesting course corrections 
5% of the cost of service provision, spread evenly over the 
years service is provided (~$240,000 p.a., ~$720,000 total) 
4. Cost of independent 
adviser 
Traditional role of analyzing results and reporting 
performance 
5% of the cost of service provision, spread evenly over every 
year of the SIB (~$60,000 p.a., ~$720,000 total) 
5. Management fee to 
intermediary 
Up-front fee to intermediary to coordinate and oversee 
program delivery 
1% of the cost of service provision, spread evenly over the 
years service is provided (~$50,000 p.a., ~$140,000 total) 
7. Principal drawn down Funds required from investors in each year Principal drawn down as required over first 3 years ($16 million 
total) 
11. Savings to taxpayers Average benefits to taxpayers retained by government 50% of net savings after costs of service provision and SIB 
structure ($4 million total) 
12. Success fee to service 
provider and intermediary 
Contingent fee to intermediary/service provider based 
on program s success 
10% of any returns to investors after principal is repaid (~
$410,000 total) 
10. Cumulative net 
savings 
Total net savings accrued to date since start of SIB – 
14. Cumulative investor 
net cash flow 
Total investor net cash flow accrued to date since start 
of SIB 
– 
13. Investor net cash flow Flow of funds from and to investors in each year 
based on average benefits to taxpayers 
Payouts every 2 years, beginning in year 4, based on realized 
taxpayer benefits to date 
1. Constituents treated Number of program participants 1,500 per year for each of first 3 years 
6. Total cost of SIB Sum of costs of service provision, evaluation adviser, 
independent assessor, and management fee 
– 
8. Benefits to taxpayers Average benefits from program accruing to taxpayers 
(e.g., reduced government spending) 
Source: WSIPP1 model estimates for youths on probation in 
Washington state provided by Pew s Results First project 
Exhibit 4.2: Pro forma terminology and assumptions
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The fact that FFT alone can break even in 8 years, whereas FFT scaled through a SIB needs 12 
years to break even, highlights a crucial point: SIBs are a more expensive way to finance the scal-
ing up of preventive programs than if the government simply went directly to service providers 
and paid them to expand an intervention to more constituents. But while there are cheaper and 
less complicated ways (such as grants and conventional contracts) to scale programs, we do not 
see many preventive programs at scale today. This suggests that in order to scale at least some 
types of programs successfully, government can benefit from support in the form of additional 
capacity, supplemental expertise, and outside risk capital—all hallmarks of a SIB.
The “premium” inherent in scaling programs through SIBs is justified only if conventional options 
aren’t working and if the SIB structure is adding value commensurate with its cost. SIBs are also 
worth the premium if they do more than simply support the scaling of a discrete intervention—that 
is, if they help usher in new ways for social sector actors to align their priorities and play their roles 
more effectively and efficiently. SIBs appear to have potential to spur cooperation and help trans-
form performance in the social sector.
We determined the present value of all total benefits to society generated from scaling FFT for 
4,500 participants to be $142 million, of which $36 million is taxpayer benefits (Exhibit 4.3).  
However, our pro forma analysis indicates that for each FFT participant, only 58 percent of  
these taxpayer benefits ($19 million) are actually realized within 12 years of the intervention.  







Benefits to other 
members of society 
(primarily averted 
victims of crime) 
$17 million 
(12%) 
Benefits to participants 
(primarily increased 
earnings) 
Benefits to taxpayers during 
life of 12-year SIB 
Benefits to taxpayers 
after life of SIB 
SIB can capture benefits worth $19 million in present 
value, which is $24 million in undiscounted current value 
Benefits are primarily due to reduced use of prisons and 
other elements of criminal justice system 
Present value of 
total benefits to 
society: 
$142 million 
2010 dollars, inflation adjusted and discounted at 3.5% real interest rate  
Exhibit 4.3: Functional Family Therapy SIB pro forma: present value of all  benefits to society
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The earliest SIBs will be under intense scrutiny.  
All involved will want to understand the economics 
of this new approach, how long the SIB will be in 
place, when performance milestones will occur, 
















Cost of SIB 
structure 
1.6 





life of SIB 
24.1 
Investors would receive a 
nominal internal rate of 
return of ~5% p.a. if the 
program achieved its 




Scenario reflects program 
achieving its average projected 
social impact—there is a possibility 
that investors will lose their capital 
if the program fails to deliver 
2010 millions of dollars per participant (inflation adjusted, undiscounted) 
Exhibit 4.4: Functional Family Therapy SIB pro forma: projected returns
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This has obvious implications for investors, as their repayment is tied to taxpayer benefits (which 
come from lower incarceration rates, increased taxes, and lower health care costs attributed to  
increased educational attainment). It also illustrates that financial savings to government and  
financial returns to investors cannot be the only motivator for SIBs. Indeed, social impact must drive 
SIB stakeholders because the short-term financial argument alone considers only a fraction of the 
full value created through interventions with long-term impact. 
It is also important to acknowledge that savings may exist in the system but may not be realized 
for reasons beyond the control of the SIB organizers. For example, government may not be able to 
aggregate savings across agencies and ring-fence it. Or government could decide to redeploy the 
savings to help people who had been underserved in the past when facilities were at capacity. A SIB 
might reduce the need for beds among a specific group of targeted constituents, for instance, but 
government could decide to fill those beds with new populations.
If the FFT intervention achieves its expected average outcome and yields $24 million in taxpayer 
benefits (undiscounted current value), investors would receive a nominal internal rate of return of  
approximately 5 percent per annum (Exhibit 4.4).60 
 
DIFFERENT INTERVENTION, DIFFERENT TIME FRAME
At 12 years, the time frame for repaying investors in this pro forma analysis (Exhibit 4.5) is long by 
the standards of many interested in the SIB approach. We doubt a 12-year SIB will be palatable to 
investors, government, or other stakeholders in the near future—even if the SIB were structured like 
our pro forma analysis (that is, with multiple cohorts, allowing early progress to be visible). We expect 
that 4 to 6 years will be the longest time frame an early SIB is likely to stretch. 
60 Assumes a 2 percent per annum inflation rate.
SIBs are worth pursuing, and their potential can be 
realized because the right conditions are already in 
place, but turning potential into action will 
require great effort
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It is important to note that the time frame for capturing taxpayer benefits varies depending on the 
nature of the intervention. An intervention like the one assumed in our pro forma analysis—FFT 
administered to 15-year-olds on probation—will pay off over the lifetime of the program partici-
pants. There is a typical age range when youth are most likely to recidivate, and that period goes 
beyond the four- to six-year time frame of an ideal SIB. 
In contrast, a SIB focused on scaling up Permanent Supportive Housing would begin to yield 
benefits almost immediately, because chronically homeless people housed in a safe and healthy 
environment would stop going to shelters and emergency rooms as soon as their living situation 
was stabilized. The cost-benefit time path would be much shorter due to the specific characteris-
tics of the problem and its solution.
 
WHAT THE ANALYSIS TELLS US ABOUT SIBs IN GENERAL
It bears repeating that this pro forma analysis illustrates only one SIB and does not represent SIB 
economics in general.61  It is not yet clear what the market will bear when it comes to intermediary 
management fees, success fees for the intermediary and for the nonprofit service providers, fees 
61 Some respondents to the Massachusetts request for response have indicated they plan to develop pro forma analyses as part of 
their submission and make them public.
2.  Cost of service provision 
3.  Cost of evaluation adviser 
4.  Cost of independent 
assessor 
5.  Management fee to 
intermediary 
7.  Principal drawn down 
11. Savings to taxpayers 
12. Success fee to service 
provider and intermediary 
10. Cumulative net savings 
14. Cumulative investor net 
cash flow 
13. Investor net cash flow 
1.  Constituents treated 
6.  Total cost of SIB 
8.  Benefits to taxpayers 




































































































































































































Thousands of 2010 dollars (inflation adjusted, undiscounted) 
Exhibit 4.5: Functional Family Therapy SIB pro forma: breakeven for investors occurs in year 12
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for evaluation advisers and independent assessors, investor returns, and how government will 
share benefits with the other SIB parties. We made assumptions based on the extensive inter-
views we conducted with relevant stakeholders, but the first SIBs won’t necessarily bear them 
out. Like any negotiated transaction, there is likely to be a gap between theory—no matter how 
thoughtful the model analysis is—and reality. Each SIB—especially in the early years—will be 
negotiated and structured in a bespoke fashion. 
The scale of the intervention matters to the economics of a SIB. In a jurisdiction where the num-
ber of constituents for a given intervention falls below a certain threshold, a SIB may not “work.” 
The biggest cost savings occurs not when fewer constituents are served, but rather when the 
need to serve constituents is decreased substantially—for example, when an entire prison or 
other capital facility can be closed down. For this reason, looking at costs on a per person or 
incremental basis can be misleading. 
Because SIBs are both location- and program-specific, our estimates of taxpayer benefits apply 
only to Washington state and FFT within the juvenile justice space. Costs for preventive and re-
medial programs differ significantly by jurisdiction and intervention areas. Consequently, the total 
taxpayer benefits and the time frame in which those benefits are realized will also differ signifi-
cantly. What does this mean? Stated simply, there are no shortcuts when it comes to analyzing 
SIBs. In jurisdictions where the cost-benefit analysis on a given intervention has not yet been 
done, there will be important work to do even before the process of structuring the SIB begins. 
What’s the potential for taxpayer 
benefits? How long will it take to pay back 
investors? What are the costs inherent 
in the SIB structure? Our analysis shows 
how one SIB could play out...
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5. Conclusion
Our research suggests that SIBs have specific benefits and that the right conditions are in place 
today to implement SIBs: evidence-based social interventions already exist, there is sufficient 
stakeholder capacity, and there is real interest and momentum to make SIBs a reality. But turning 
potential into action will require a clear choice to move ahead and concerted effort to implement 
this new tool: stakeholders must overcome several challenges, a number of proof points must be 
demonstrated, and making SIBs more widespread will require some standardization. 
In this final chapter, we explore what needs to happen for SIBs to succeed, if stakeholders choose 
to use them. And we acknowledge SIBs as one part of a broader conversation about public-pri-
vate collaboration and innovation to serve people and communities better.
 
REQUIREMENTS FOR A CONDUCIVE ENVIRONMENT
All new markets require a great deal of initial work, and SIBs are no exception. If SIBs are to gain 
traction as a new tool, the first few SIBs must be executed carefully and well, and not done just 
for novelty’s sake. More specifically, ensuring a successful conclusion to the SIB story will require 
stakeholders to take three specific actions.
Clear up confusion through a robust education and communications plan. 
A strong, well-coordinated effort to inform stakeholders about what SIBs are—and are not—will 
prove invaluable. This effort will need to be led by intermediaries, with assistance from advisers, 
academics, and the media. There are three key messages to communicate. It’s new: Fear of the 
unknown could present a problem, and stakeholders will need to get comfortable with the new 
SIB structure and risk-return profile. Similarly, SIBs will be unfamiliar to many because the model 
hinges on a multistakeholder partnership. It’s complicated: Because they won’t be accustomed 
to “taxpayer benefits” as the underlying source of return, investors will need to gain confidence 
that government will make payments. It’s not a bond: Investors and others still struggling to wrap 
their heads around SIBs are distracted and confused by the word “bond,” which is a misnomer.
Recognize SIBs as a tool for scaling up social benefits. 
SIBs intend to replace a more expensive, less effective remedial program with a less expensive, 
more effective preventive program. On its face, this plan should save money and generate tax-
payer benefits. But SIBs won’t fund government deficits and won’t help investors get rich quick. 
Great financial expectations will likely produce great disappointment. What SIBs can do: SIBs 
can catalyze a number of positive reactions: they can generate more effective results, help gov-
ernment shift its focus from remediation to prevention, and realign government operations. What 
SIBs (probably) can’t do: SIBs are not universally appropriate for all program areas, govern-
ments, or investors; they aren’t the easiest way for direct service providers to fund expansion; and 
they’re not a source of free money that can be used to subsidize government coffers. Assessing 
investor appetite: Financial returns to investors will also vary in timing and magnitude. Because 
the risk of principal loss is unlikely to ever be offset by the potential financial upside, only inves-
tors who care about the social bottom line to some extent are likely to care about SIBs.
 Design and implement with care. 
SIBs aren’t plug and play. Although each SIB must be custom designed, all SIBs will benefit from 
several key considerations. Cooperation is king: A SIB will function effectively only if every 
stakeholder is willing and able to uphold its end of the deal and fulfill its unique roles and 
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responsibilities. Stakeholders must be on the same page; their interests must be aligned and 
compatible. Success requires effective project management: Like any multistakeholder part-
nership, SIBs require participants to make a substantial investment of time and energy.  
Relationships among stakeholders must also be managed—this is important throughout the 
process, but especially so when things don’t go according to plan. SIBs are more likely to achieve 
their goals if tracking, course correction, and project management are all part of the process. 
Pledge allegiance but be flexible: Successful scaling involves delivering a proven program, 
faithfully adhering to its core components, and conducting staff training, quality control, and 
monitoring. It’s important to ensure fidelity, but it is also critical to adapt interventions for specific 
constituents and contexts. Indeed, local knowledge and cultural nuance must guide the interven-
tion, even as the basic principles remain consistent. Flexibility and credibility are important 
when it comes to evaluation: Social intervention evaluations are inherently complicated and 
time-consuming, but the high-stakes nature of SIBs—outcomes are tied to cash payments—
means they’re also likely to be costly. To make evaluations less expensive, SIBs can select proven 
interventions and investigate cost-conscious evaluation methodologies. Utilizing administrative 
data, for example, might save money on the evaluation costs of the SIB. Another idea is to obtain 
separate evaluation funding from foundations or from the federal government to defray high costs. 
Foundations that can’t make program-related investments but want to support SIBs may be 
interested in helping to defray evaluation costs. But interest may not result in action: hindered by 
reduced endowments, many foundations are contending with decreased evaluation budgets.
A TALL ORDER:  THE FIRST WAVE OF SIBS MUST DEMONSTRATE A NUMBER OF  
NEAR-TERM PROOF POINTS TO JUSTIFY SCALING
P  Pilots in multiple jurisdictions to demonstrate that SIBs work in different cost environments;  
under centralized and decentralized government structures; and under a range of conditions such  
as different procurement rules and different government data collection standards
P  Pilots in multiple program areas to demonstrate that SIBs work across various evidence-based 
programs; in different assessment and data situations; with a range of service providers and  
evaluators; and under a range of government funding schemes
P  Diversity of SIB investors beyond purely philanthropic funding to demonstrate that impact 
investors have potential demand for SIBs and that SIBs will not cannibalize grant funding
P  Clear evidence of social outcomes to demonstrate successful scaling of evidence-based  
programs with SIBs and the ability of programs to reach performance targets
P  Proof of decreased use of remedial services due to successful scaling of preventive interventions 
under SIBs, to demonstrate the basis for government savings regardless of whether the savings can  
be successfully coordinated and captured
P  Track record of payments to investors to demonstrate that government will uphold its  
responsibility for this nontraditional instrument that is likely to be subject to annual appropriations, 
and to show coordination among agencies for savings and repayment
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SIB SCALING WILL REQUIRE STANDARDIZATION
It won’t be difficult to generate initial interest in SIBs—a number of first movers are eager to con-
duct early test drives—but the real challenge will be gaining traction once the novelty wears off. 
Early SIBs are all likely to be unique. For now, if you’ve seen one SIB, you’ve seen one SIB. This 
makes spreading the model difficult. A little standardization will go a long way. 
All nascent markets benefit from standards, norms, and common tools that help maximize ef-
ficiency and scale. SIBs are no exception. While they will always be relatively bespoke, SIBs will 
benefit from standardization as soon as—and wherever—possible. Some of what’s needed is 
upstream, related to the program intervention, while other enablers relate to the SIB model itself. 
Stakeholders interested in advancing SIBs can do so by helping to create standards in the follow-
ing areas:
Best practice methods for cost-benefit analysis. The economics of an evidence-based 
program intervention will be different in different parts of the country. To determine if a SIB has 
potential, the financial and social costs and benefits must be examined for the specific community 
being explored. Once the costs and benefits have been modeled for an intervention in one locale, 
sharing the methodology will allow other cities and states to run the numbers more quickly and 
motivate them to consider bringing a SIB to their backyard.
Scoping new program areas and geographies. Each time SIBs move into a new program 
area—from homelessness and criminal justice to health or education, for example—there will be a 
steep learning curve. Stakeholders will need to do thorough research on which interventions have 
the strongest evidence base, the complexities of relevant government funding systems, the ca-
pacity of specialist service providers, and evaluators and intermediaries with germane expertise. 
Their findings will be different in each city and state. Communities of practice—or other flexible 
models that allow peers to share information and consult one another with targeted questions—
could facilitate this process.
Diagnostics, due diligence, term sheets, and more. Stakeholders considering if they are right 
for SIBs, and if SIBs are right for them, need diagnostic tools to get started and due-diligence 
tools to assess potential partners in a thorough and consistent manner. (We have developed rapid 
suitability questionnaires and a due-diligence review of partner capabilities; these tools will be 
available at payforsuccess.org.) As new SIB deals close, intermediaries and others will be under 
pressure to balance the importance of maintaining their intellectual property with the value to the 
field of making term sheets and report formats publicly available so that each SIB doesn’t have to 
reinvent the wheel.
SIB partnership care and feeding. Each SIB will likely involve a new group of stakeholders and 
will have to break down a new set of silos. General best practices about building and maintaining 
partnerships will only go so far. Specific lessons learned about what it takes to make a SIB part-
nership successful, and how to track, calculate, and aggregate costs and savings across govern-
ment agencies will be invaluable. SIB pioneers can help other stakeholders by reflecting on what 
works and what doesn’t, and sharing their experience.
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LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
Because SIBs are so new, much remains to be seen. The jury is still out on whether SIBs will gain 
traction as a tool for scaling social programs. And new market development is inherently messy.  
While we don’t presume to predict what will happen next with SIBs, we have given some thought 
to questions that are beyond the scope of our research, and remain open: 
•  Financing and funding? Will SIBs become a permanent part of the government financing  
landscape? When a SIB matures, how will the preventive program be funded? 
•  A true transition? If SIBs successfully demonstrate the benefits of preventive programs, what 
will happen next? Will government fund additional preventive programs by contracting directly 
with service providers?  And will the ongoing assessment and summative evaluation be  
maintained?
•  More toward the middle? If government sees the value and savings attributed to preventive 
programs, will it begin to issue traditional municipal bonds to provide financing or follow the 
state of Minnesota’s approach?
•  A new era? Will SIBs advance a government focus on outcomes, interdepartmental and agency 
collaboration, and evidence-based approaches to social solutions?
The first few SIBs may look quite different from one another and are not likely to be structured and 
implemented in an identical fashion. There is real value in being open to and experimenting with 
a range of models and results. Stakeholders should consider that success may mean different 
things and manifest in different ways. One SIB may receive high marks if it delivers social out-
comes but doesn’t realize cashable government savings. Another, very different SIB could demon-
strate utility for a select group of program areas but prove inefficient for other fields. Flexibility is 
key.  
Catalyzing change 
As we have observed throughout this report, SIBs are a comparatively expensive way to scale a 
program, and for that reason not every proven program should necessarily be scaled through a 
SIB. This means SIBs must be carefully deployed to serve a bigger purpose.
We have invested in this study of SIBs because we see them as part of a broader effort to trans-
form the social sector to better serve the needs of people and their communities. Whether or not 
SIBs become a popular approach to scaling interventions, they have already generated excite-
ment and enthusiasm for finding new ways to address persistent social problems. The model’s 
basic tenets—increased multistakeholder collaboration, focus on results, appropriate risk alloca-
tion, and alignment of incentives—are key to addressing myriad social sector challenges.  
SIBs are highly relevant for catalyzing the right kind of conversation, promoting innovative re-
sponses to social problems, and linking impact with the resources that can make a real change 
in the world. If SIBs galvanize a new wave of innovation and pave the way for other alternative 
models, their impact will be truly meaningful.
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Here, we present the objective, scope, and methodology of our efforts to 
estimate national government spending on remedial homeless programs. 
Our estimates are intended to approximate current government remedial 
spending on homelessness at the federal, state, and local levels Objective 
US homeless population 
Total government spending at the federal, state, and local levels (excludes 
nongovernment spending, such as donations from charitable organizations) 
We included spending on remedial programs but not preventive programs 
– Remedial expenditures include spending on homeless (e.g., shelters) 
– Preventive expenditures address spending on: 
Populations at risk of becoming homeless (e.g., rental voucher programs) 
Formerly homeless populations (e.g., Permanent Supportive Housing 
programs) 
Scope 
Using federal figures, agency Web sites, research reports, and expert 
interviews, we identified the major components of national homelessness 
spending and classified them under targeted programs or mainstream 
programs. We then calculated total expenditures for each category 
We estimated total spending for 2010, the most recent year from which data 
are available 
Methodology 
We used separate approaches to calculate targeted and 
mainstream spending. 
Targeted programs are specifically designed for 
individuals or families experiencing homelessness 
Through a USICH1 report, we obtained 2010 federal 
spending estimates on targeted programs and classified 
them as preventive or remedial (we used expert 
interviews to verify these classifications) 
– For Continuum of Care (COC) federal HUD1 
programs, a 2010 report estimated that ~61% of COC 
spending was preventive 
We then applied state/local matching ratios to all 
federal remedial programs to determine total government 
spending on targeted remedial programs 
Targeted spending 
In addition to expert interviews, we also used various published reports 
Opening Doors: Federal strategic plan to prevent and end homelessness: Update 2011 (including appendix), USICH1 
The 2010 annual homelessness assessment report to Congress, HUD1 
2010 Continuum of Care Assistance Program Grants Awards, HUD1 
Melford J. Henderson and Stephen W. Hwang, Health care utilization in homeless people: Translating research into policy and practice, 
HHS1 
Homeless assistance program funding: Federal versus state and local assistance, July 2011, NAEH1 
1 USICH = US Interagency Council on Homelessness; HUD = US Department of Housing and Urban Development; TANF = Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families; SSI = Supplemental Security Income; HHS = US Department of Health and Human Services; NAEH = National Alliance to End 
Homelessness. 
A 
Mainstream programs are programs designed to serve a 
broader population (e.g., low income) 
We focused on Medicaid, TANF1, and SSI1/food stamps/
child welfare, as expert interviews indicated that these 
programs account for a majority of mainstream 
homelessness spending  
– We segmented the homeless population (e.g., chronic 
vs nonchronic or individuals vs families) and calculated 
cost per user for each segment  
Expert interviews indicate that spending on other 
mainstream programs was relatively small and since we 
could not obtain data to approximate spending for these 
programs, we took a conservative approach and 
assumed this other mainstream spending to be minimal 
Mainstream spending B 
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Our estimate for total 2010 federal, state, and local government spending 
on remedial homeless programs is approximately $6 billion to $7 billion. 
Source: Secondary research; expert interviews; McKinsey analysis 
Note: Numbers may not add exactly due to rounding. 
1 Government spending includes only remedial expenditures and not preventive expenditures (for example, does not include programs to prevent low-income individuals from becoming 
homeless or any spending on Permanent Supportive Housing and related services). 
2 Government spending includes sum of federal, state, and local government spending on homeless population. 
3 HUD = US Department of Housing and Urban Development; HHS = US Department of Health and Human Services; VA = US Department of Veterans Affairs; TANF = Temporary Assistance 
to Needy Families; SSI = Supplemental Security Income. 
Total govt. spending 
on remedial homeless 
programs1 
2010 govt. spending1,2 















~0.9 SSI3/food stamps/ 
child welfare 
Total: 
Targeted programs: programs that are 
specifically designed for individuals or families 
that are experiencing homelessness 
Mainstream programs: programs designed to 











Minimal (as indicated 
in expert interviews) 
HUD3, HHS3, and VA3 
programs account for 




indicate that Medicaid, 
TANF3, SSI3/food 
stamps/child welfare 
are the most important 
mainstream programs 
for the homeless 
population 
Total government spending on remedial homeless programs is 















% of total 
targeted 
spending Comments 
~61% of HUD2 Continuum of Care funds 
are spent on Permanent Supportive 
Housing and thus excluded from estimate 
HUD2 expenditures are generally matched 
at a 1:1 ratio by state and local funding3 
~50% of HHS2 targeted program funds are 
for Health Care for the Homeless program 
Most HHS2 programs matched at a 1:1 
ratio by state and local funding except for 
the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act 
Veterans account for ~12% of the 
homeless population 
Most nonfederal VA2 funding comes from 
private sources (minimal state/city 
matching) 
Includes programs under other federal 
departments (i.e., DHS, ED, DOJ, DOL)4 
Over 60% of other targeted program funds 






































Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding. 
1 Based on expert estimates. 
2 HUD = US Department of Housing and Urban Development; HHS = US Department of Health and Human Services; VA = US Department of Veterans Affairs. 
3 Direct match is slightly lower than 1:1 but ratio takes into account other state and locally funded programs. 
4 DHS = US Department of Homeland Security; ED = US Department of Education; DOJ = US Department of Justice; DOL = US Department of Labor.  
A 
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Homelessness technical appendix
Our estimate for federal spending on remedial HUD programs  
is ~$0.8 billion. 
Source: Appendix to Opening Doors: Federal strategic plan to prevent and end homelessness: Update 2011; Continuum 
of Care dashboard reports (www.hudhre.info); expert interviews; McKinsey analysis 
HUD1 federal spending 
on targeted programs ($ billion) 
0.1 
Continuum  





















Preventive vs remedial  
split of COC grants4 ($ billion) 
Federal government spending on 








1 US Department of Health and Human Services. 
2 HUD-VASH = HUD-Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing program. 
3 Continuum of Care programs include Permanent Supportive Housing, Shelter Plus Care, and Section 8 Mod Rehab/SRO. 
4 Split between Permanent Supportive Housing and other programs for Continuum of Care (COC) grants obtained from COC dashboard reports (www.hudhre.info).   
5 Permanent Supportive Housing.  
A1 
.8 
Total federal spending on remedial non-HUD programs  
is approximately $1.2 billion. 






($ million)  
Preventive/ 
remedial Targeted program 
ED1: Education for Homeless Children and Youth 65 Remedial 
DOJ1: Transitional Assistance Housing Program 17 Remedial 
Total other 335 
Total HHS 429 
Grants for the Benefit of Homeless Individuals 43 Remedial 
Health Care for the Homeless 171 Remedial 
Services in Supportive Housing Grants 35 Preventive 
Projects for Assistance in Transition from Homelessness 65 Remedial 
Runaway and Homeless Youth Act 116 Remedial 
Health Care for Homeless Veterans 110 Remedial 
Total VA 486 
Veterans Justice Outreach Initiative 5 Remedial 
Domiciliary Care for Homeless Veterans 176 Remedial 
Supportive Services for Veteran Families 20 Preventive 
Homeless Providers Grant and Per Diem Program 175 Remedial 
DOL1: Homeless Veterans Reintegration Program 36 Remedial 
DHS1: Emergency Food and Shelter Program 200 Remedial 
DOL1: Stand Downs (grants) 1 Remedial 
DOL1: Veterans Homeless Prevention Demonstration 








A2 A3 A4 
1 HHS = US Department of Health and Human Services; VA = US Department of Veterans Affairs; DHS = US Department of Homeland Security; ED = US 
Department of Education; DOL = US Department of Labor: DOJ = US Department of Justice; US Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
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Utilizing bottom-up and top-down approaches, we estimated Medicaid 





Spending by constituent type 
Chronic  
Not chronic: 
persons in families  
Not chronic:  
individuals  
2010 Medicaid costs for 
homeless Total 
No. of constituents (Thousand) 
% enrolled and using Medicaid 
Annual cost per user ($) 
Total 2010 spending on 






















% of mainstream homeless spending 
0.6 2010 Federal Medicaid spending on 
homeless ($ billion) 
~682 Federal spending as % of  
total spending 
0.9 Total 2010 spending on homeless  
($ billion) 
Note: Figures may not add exactly due to rounding. 
1 Includes pre-enrolled, presumptively eligible,  and ineligible population, which comprises ~100% of chronic homeless population.  
2 Assumes same federal/state/local split for homeless as for all of Medicaid. 
Source: Department of Health and Human Services Web site on Medicaid; appendix to Opening Doors: Federal strategic plan to 




homeless to be ~$1.5 
billion–$2 billion 
B 
TANF spending on homeless-family households is  
approximately $0.6 billion. 
Source: Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Web Site; US Interagency Council on Homelessness federal budget 
appropriations; secondary research; expert interviews; McKinsey analysis  
1 Based on expert estimates. 












% of homeless 













~79 ~15 ~2,000 ~0.3 Child care 
~79 ~25 ~400 ~0.1 Cash assistance 
Shelter 
~0.3 Funds are used to support transitional 
housing and other sheltered housing that is 
not covered under targeted programs 
B 
Note: HH denotes household. Numbers may not add  exactly due to rounding. 
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SSI/food stamps/child welfare program spending on homeless 
is approximately $0.9 billion. 
Source: Secondary research; expert interviews; McKinsey analysis  
Note: HH denotes household. 
1 Supplemental Security Income. 
Monthly 
spending per 











Individuals 407,966 5%  500  0.1 
Families (HH) 79,446 4%  500  0.02 
Total 0.1 
Individuals 407,966 90%  90  0.4 
Families (HH) 79,446 90%  200  0.2 
Total 0.6 
Families (HH) 79,446 5%  5,000  0.2 
Total SSI1/food 
stamps/child welfare 0.9 
B 
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Criminal justice technical 
appendix
This presents the objective, scope, and methodology of our efforts to estimate 
national government spending on criminal and juvenile justice, as well as the number 
of constituents who may be candidates for preventive community-based interventions 
suitable for SIBs. 
Number of constituents 
Objective 
Scope 
Adult inmates who were incarcerated for drug-related 
offenses 
Adult inmates who were incarcerated with mental health 
or substance abuse disorders  




We identified the number of adult inmates who were 
either incarcerated for drug-related offenses or had 
mental health or substance abuse disorders by drawing 
 From Behind bars II: Substance abuse and America s 
prison population, a 2010 report from The National 
Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia 
University  
– 2006 is the most recent year for which data are 
available 
We identified the number of juveniles held in residential 
placement for nonviolent offenses from the Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention s Census 
of juveniles in residential placement 
– 2007 is the most recent year for which data are 
available 
1 Costs ranged from $24 in Wyoming to $726 in Connecticut (2008 American Correctional Association statistics, presented in The costs of confinement: Why good juvenile justice policies 
make good fiscal sense, Justice Policy Institute, May 2009). 
2 Steve Aos et al, “Return on investment: Evidence-based options to improve statewide outcomes,” Technical Appendix II Methods and User Manual, Washington State Institute for Public 
Policy, July 2011, Exhibit D2.a. 
3 National Association of State Budget Officers, State juvenile justice expenditures and innovations, 1998 estimate of $4.2 billion scaled by growth in total (adult and youth) corrections 
spending from 1998 to 2007, and ratio of total state and local spending to state-only spending. 
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics; Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention; McKinsey analysis  
Size of government criminal- and juvenile justice spending 
Our estimates are intended to approximate the number 
of adults incarcerated and juveniles held in residential 
placement who may be candidates for preventive 
community-based alternatives to incarceration 
Our estimates are intended to approximate government spending on 
criminal and juvenile justice at the national, state, and local level 
Total government spending at the federal, state, and local level 
We focused on the corrections component of criminal-and juvenile-
justice spending, including all correctional and confinement institutions 
holding prisoners for more than 48 hours, probation activities, parole and 
pardon boards and programs, and halfway houses 
We used comprehensive national expenditure data published by the 
Department of Justice s Bureau of Justice Statistics to determine total 
government spending on criminal justice 
– 2007 is the most recent year from which data are available 
– Spending is broken out for federal, state, and local governments, but 
few other estimates are available for the entire country 
We then used 3 different approaches to estimate total government 
spending on juvenile justice 
– Extrapolated absolute cost from results of 2008 national survey on 
average daily juvenile justice expenditures1 
– Determined relative cost based on detailed data from Washington, 
which stated that it costs ~3 times as much to incarcerate a youth as it 
does an adult2 
– Updated and broadened state-level data on juvenile justice spending 
from a comprehensive 1998 survey3 
We developed guiding principles for determining government spending  
on criminal and juvenile justice. Details follow 
Social impact bonds (SIBs) monetize social outcomes by capturing  
the value between the cost of prevention now and the price of  
remediation in the future 
To understand the pool of government spending (a fraction of which 
SIBs could potentially address), we focused on the corrections 
component of criminal- and juvenile justice spending1 
– Since some constituents are not eligible to receive preventive 
interventions, only a fraction of this remedial spending is 
addressable by SIBs 
– Although there are no national statistics, experts believe that only 
a small share of corrections spending goes to preventive 
programs (e.g., reentry programs) 
– Other components of criminal justice spending, such as police 
protection, are less directly tied to remediation 
Comprehensive national expenditure data are published by the 
Department of Justice s Bureau of Justice Statistics 
– 2007 is the most recent year available, due to the time it takes the 
US Census Bureau to collect local government-spending data 
– Spending is broken out for federal, state, and local governments, 
but very few other estimates are available for the entire country 
We verified our assumptions and the estimates we used with multiple 
experts in the fields of criminal and juvenile justice 
Although only a fraction of this is addressable 
by SIBs, national corrections spending was 
$74 billion in 2007: 
1 Corrections spending includes all correctional and confinement institutions holding prisoners for more than 48 hours, probation activities, parole and pardon boards 
and programs, and halfway houses. 












We estimate that spending on youths 
accounted for ~10% of this ($7bn) 
Because the cost of incarceration varies 
substantially with inmate characteristics, it is 
not possible to reliably estimate remedial 
spending for specific subpopulations that 
are potential targets for SIBs at the national 
level  
But because these subpopulations are 
incarcerated by state and local authorities for 
which more granular cost estimates are often 
available, this lack of national data is not likely 
to present a major barrier to the adoption of 
SIBs for criminal and juvenile justice 
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National corrections system, 20071 


















1 Adults: estimated adults aged 18+ in jails and prisons (Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), Correctional populations in the United States,  2010); youths: total juveniles under 21 years held in residential placement facilities 
(Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Census of juveniles in residential placement, 1997–2010) plus juveniles under 18 years held in state prisons and local jails (BJS, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice 
Statistics, www.albany.edu/sourcebook). 
2 Costs ranged from $24 in Wyoming to $726 in Connecticut (2008 American Correctional Association statistics, presented in The costs of confinement: Why good juvenile justice policies make good fiscal sense, Justice Policy 
Institute, May 2009). 
3 Approach assumes that adult and youth systems spend the same share of their budgets on non-inmate costs (for example, probation activities). 
4 Steve Aos et al, “Return on investment: Evidence-based options to improve statewide outcomes,” Technical Appendix II Methods and User Manual, Washington State Institute for Public Policy, July 2011, Exhibit D2.a. 
5 National Association of State Budget Officers, State juvenile justice expenditures and innovations, 1998 estimate of $4.2 billion scaled by growth in total (adult and youth) corrections spending from 1998 to 2007, and ratio of 
total state and local spending to state-only spending. 
6 Compound annual growth rate. 
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics; Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention; McKinsey analysis  
Youth share of corrections spending 
In the absence of any comprehensive national data, we used 3 
approaches to estimate that spending on youth corrections was 
$7 billion to $8 billion in 2007 
Absolute cost of youth incarceration: $7.9 billion, based on 
$241 daily avg. cost of youth incarceration from national survey2,3 
– 87,000 youths in juvenile facilities x $241 per day x 365 days 
– 9,000 youths in adult facilities at same daily cost as adults 
Relative cost of youth incarceration: $7.5 billion, based on 
detailed data from Washington that states that it costs ~3 times as 
much to incarcerate a youth as it does an adult3,4 
– Marginal operating cost of state institution is $37,000 per 
youth but only $13,000 per adult, a multiple of ~3x 
– Youths are only 4% of those incarcerated, but if each costs 
~3x more than each adult, then youths will account for ~10% 
of total national spending 
Updating and broadening state-level data: $7.5 billion, starting 
with comprehensive 1998 state expenditure survey5 
– $4.2 billion spending by the states in 1998 multiplied by 
– 1.7% CAGR6 for 9 years (growth rate of total corrections 
spending over this period) multiplied by 
– 1.5 local multiplier (2007 ratio of total state and local 
corrections spending to states-only spending) 
Despite declines in incarceration rates, many more youths could still be 
offered alternatives to incarceration. 
The number of youths in custody has fallen by  
one-fifth since 1999   
Source: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Census of juveniles in residential placement, 1997–2010; 



























Youth-custody population1, Thousand 
1 Total juveniles under 21 years held in residential-placement facilities plus juveniles under 18 years held in state prisons and local jails.  
2 Committed  is juvenile equivalent of convicted .  Count includes those in residential placement for diversion and other reasons (fewer than 2,000). 
3 Includes status offenses. 
but more than 50,000 youths are still being held in 
residential placement for nonviolent offenses 





















and ~1.6 million inmates have a mental 
health or substance abuse disorder  
Almost three-quarters of adult inmates have a mental health or  
substance abuse disorder, but few are receiving treatment. 
Source: The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University, Behind bars II: Substance abuse 
and America s prison population, February 2010 
Thousands of adult inmates, 2006 

















1 Defined as any past diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder or history of treatment. 
2 Defined by medical criteria for drug or alcohol abuse or dependence in year prior to arrest. 
3 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Mental health problems of prison and jail inmates, September 2006. Mental health problems defined more 













crime for money 
to buy drugs 
340 
(15%) 
..but few offenders are receiving 
treatment  
~900,000 inmates are incarcerated 
for drug-related reasons  
Risk assessment models (e.g., 
Violence risk appraisal guide) 
can be used to predict which of 
these offenders can be safely 
treated in the community 
Only 11% of inmates with 
substance abuse disorders 
have received any 
professional treatment since 
admission 
Only 27% of inmates with 
mental health problems have 
received any professional 
treatment since admission3 
Only 35% of conditionally 
released (e.g., paroled) 
offenders with substance
abuse disorders received any 
form of addiction treatment 
